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Prior academic research has recognized human judgment as an indispensable decision-
aid in demand forecasting although it is subject to a number of biases. Therefore, it is
important to understand human judgment in forecasting to explain poor forecast
decisions and attenuate their negative consequences for many related operational
decisions. This dissertation bundles four empirical studies on demand forecasting and is
part of a growing research field in which human behavior and cognition are incorporated
into analytical models of operations management.
The functional specialization and differentiation inherent to most organizations usually
shapes forecasting behavior in such a way that it benefits departmental goals and
agendas. Lack of clear forecast ownership, diffused responsibilities and varying interests
and incentives are often at odds with the organizational goal of producing accurate
forecasts. We identify and describe the potential benefits of forecast ownership and
mechanically combined departmental forecasts on the tendency to over- and under-
forecast demand. The findings in this dissertation also show that departmental roles offer
a particular frame with which forecasters interpret information and make decisions.
However, the effect of departmental affiliation on forecast accuracy depends on a
forecaster’s individual disposition towards cooperation and conflict. Our studies suggest
that it is paramount for organizations to manage the motivations of employees so as to
bridge the gap that organizational differentiation creates. One way to achieve that is by
directly creating incentives conducive to collaboration or by indirectly fostering goals and
motives which in turn affect forecasting and negotiation behavior.
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The forecasting dilemma 
“Prediction is very difficult. Especially if it is about the future.” – Niels Bohr 
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence about the failure to forecast. Even experts can 
be mistaken in their predictions about the future, for example when Decca Records 
rejected the Beatles after an audition in 1962 arguing that “guitar groups are on their way 
out”. Similarly, Charles H. Duell, director of the U.S. Patent Office, advised that the office 
should be closed in 1899 as “everything that can be invented has been invented.” And 
Franz Beckenbauer, German football manager, predicted a bright future for the German 
national team in 1990 saying “the German football team will be unbeatable in the future.” 
Nowadays we know that none of these predictions was fairly accurate. 
 
But why should we care about forecasts in the first place? 
 
Forecasting is important because it aids planning and reduces uncertainty. In daily 
life, most people listen to the weather forecast to decide whether or not to pack an 
umbrella. Hence, forecasting guides our actions to prepare ourselves for expected future 
events that will occur with a certain probability. In organizations, forecasting plays a 
pivotal role in the Sales and Operations Planning (S&OP) process. Companies need to 
estimate how much of their products will be sold in the next one, two or three months in 
order to plan their production accordingly. However, demand and supply are more and 
more uncertain due to global competition, rapidly changing consumer preferences, long 
lead times and supply chain disruptions. Mismatches between supply and demand, so 
called supply chain glitches, have been shown to affect a company’s short- and long-term 
profitability (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005; Hendricks & Singhal, 2009). Sources of supply 
chain glitches can be internal or external and inaccurate forecasts are one of the primary 
reasons (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003). Hence, although demand forecasts are important, the 
perfect forecast is usually impossible because the demand is influenced by a variety of 
factors and the degree of uncertainty is large (Fisher & Raman, 1996). 
8_Erim BW Protzner-Stand.job
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1.2 Traditional forecasting research 
The forecasting literature usually distinguishes between two types of forecasting. 
Quantitative (or statistical) forecasts rely on an analysis of numerical data, whereas 
qualitative (or judgmental) forecasts are based on subjective beliefs (Ord & Fildes, 2012). 
Extrapolation or causal models are examples of quantitative forecasting techniques. 
Qualitative techniques include unaided judgment or expert surveys. Traditionally, research 
on forecasting has sought to determine which (quantitative) forecasting technique leads to 
the most accurate forecasts (e.g. Makridakis & Hibon, 2000), whether judgmental, 
statistical or a combination of both approaches leads to better forecasting performance 
(Sanders, 1992; Webby & O'Connor, 1996), how different forecasts can be integrated (e.g. 
Armstrong, 2001; Clemen, 1989; Makridakis & Winkler, 1983; Winkler, 1971) and how 
demand forecasts are shared between different parties along the supply chain (e.g. Aviv, 
2001; Mishra, Raghunathan, & Yue, 2009). While research on forecasting has primarily 
focused on improving statistical forecasting methodologies (Fildes, 2006), human 
judgment remains an indispensable decision aid in practice to facilitate forecast generation 
(Fildes, Goodwin, Lawrence, & Nikolopoulos, 2009). Therefore, understanding human 
judgment in forecasting tasks is important to improve forecasting processes and ultimately 
performance. Forecasting research has only recently begun to acknowledge this human 
factor in what appeared to be a predominantly mathematical problem in the past. 
 
1.3 Behavioral research on forecasting 
This dissertation is part of a growing research field called behavioral operations 
management (BOM) in which human behavior and cognition are incorporated into 
analytical models of operations management (Gino & Pisano, 2008). The assumption of 
rationality has been an important principle for operations management theory for decades. 
The work of Simon (1956) and Tversky and Kahneman (1974) called this assumption into 
question arguing that humans have limited information processing capability and are prone 
to psychological biases that affect their decisions. Such irrational behavior, however, 
cannot be solved by providing sufficient (monetary) incentives as suggested by traditional 
economic and operations theory (Gino & Pisano, 2008). Whereas economists began to 
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incorporate deviations from rationality into their models earlier in order to explain and 
predict behavior, BOM has not emerged as a research field until just a few years ago. This 
development is important as operations management usually offers prescriptions to 
practitioners. However, as long as “these prescriptions rest on models with ungrounded 
behavioral assumptions, their usefulness in practice might be limited” (Gino & Pisano, 
2008, p. 679). 
Since its emergence as an interdisciplinary research field, BOM combines insights 
from various disciplines and includes new research methodologies, such as behavioral 
experiments, to address the gaps between normative prescriptions and actual behavior 
across a wide variety of operations management contexts (Bendoly, Donohue, & Schultz, 
2006). In their seminal paper, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), for example, conducted 
behavioral experiments to examine the behavior of decision-makers in the classic 
Newsvendor problem. They found that when people had to choose an order quantity, they 
systematically deviated from optimal quantities that would maximize their expected 
profits. They also found that these choices could not be explained by risk-aversion or risk-
seeking preferences as suggested by Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), but 
by the “anchoring and insufficient adjustment process in which subjects anchor on mean 
demand and adjust insufficiently toward optimal order quantity” (Schweitzer & Cachon, 
2000, p. 418). This pioneering research has influenced many other researchers to 
investigate human behavior in inventory decision-making (e.g. Bolton & Katok, 2008; 
Bostian, Holt, & Smith, 2008; Lau, Hasija, & Bearden, 2014; Rudi & Drake, 2014). In 
addition, BOM research has ventured into many other operations domains, including 
project management (e.g. Sting, Loch, & Stempfhuber, 2015), quality management (e.g. 
Das, Pagell, Behm, & Veltri, 2008), production and workflow (e.g. Siemsen, Roth, & 
Balasubramanian, 2008), queuing and scheduling (e.g. Powell & Schultz, 2004), and, most 
important for this dissertation, forecasting (e.g. Kremer, Moritz, & Siemsen, 2011; 
Kremer, Siemsen, & Thomas, 2012; Moritz, Siemsen, & Kremer, 2014).  
The BOM research field has seen a spike in behavioral experiments as the preferred 
research methodology in its early days. The rational for using behavioral experiments is 
the possibility to exert control over situational factors and to complement analytical 
models (Bendoly et al., 2006). However, researchers have already started to employ a 
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greater arsenal of methodologies to investigate human behavior in operations management. 
Examples include surveys (e.g. De Koster, Stam, & Balk, 2011), case studies (e.g. Bendoly 
& Cotteleer, 2008) and simulation (e.g. Oliva & Sterman, 2001). An overview of the 
disciplines and methodologies combined in BOM research is shown in Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1: Typical disciplines, methodologies and themes in BOM research 
 Cognitive 
psychology 
Social 
psychology 
Group 
dynamics 
System 
dynamics 
Typical unit 
of analysis 
 
Individual 
 
Individual 
 
Individual and 
group 
 
Group and 
organization 
 
Main 
methods 
 
Controlled 
experiment; 
Math modeling 
 
Controlled 
experiment; 
Survey methods 
 
Controlled 
experiment; 
Survey methods 
 
Simulation; 
Controlled 
experiments 
 
Key themes 
 
Heuristics, 
biases 
 
Motivation / 
goals, feedback 
Groupthink, 
Abilene 
paradox 
Stocks-and-
flows, delays 
(adapted from Bendoly, Croson, Goncalves, & Schultz, 2010) 
 
The work by Kahneman and Tversky (1974)  also stimulated extensive research on 
judgment in forecasting (Lawrence, Goodwin, O'Connor, & Önkal, 2006). For example, 
researchers have examined to what extent people use heuristics (such as availability, 
representativeness and anchoring-and adjustment heuristic) to make predictions (Harvey, 
2007). However, the role of biases and how they affect forecast accuracy has largely been 
neglected (Lawrence et al., 2006). More recently, the literature has investigated underlying 
cognitive processes that may impact forecasting performance (Moritz et al., 2014). Central 
to most behavioral research on forecasting, though, is a focus on individual decision-
makers performing a forecasting task (Lawrence et al., 2006). This is unfortunate as 
forecast decisions in many organizations are made by groups as a result of which biases 
other than cognitive limitations may impact forecasting performance. In fact, research on 
organizational forecasting indicates that departmental roles influence human behavior in 
forecasting processes (Oliva & Watson, 2009; Önkal, Lawrence, & Zeynep Sayim, 2011). 
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1.4 Dissertation overview 
In this dissertation, I will consider behavioral factors in demand forecasting on both 
the individual as well as group level. As such, I will draw upon theories ranging from 
cognitive and social psychology as well as group dynamics to complement the traditional 
theories on judgmental forecasting. To account for these different units of analysis, this 
dissertation also employs different research methodologies that allow for either 
contextually rich data from a real-world setting (such as the case study in Chapter 2) or 
focused observations about cause-and-effect relationships in very controlled environments 
(such as the behavioral experiments in Chapters 3 to 5). All chapters are stand-alone 
articles that either have been submitted to academic journals, or are prepared for 
submission. Therefore, I will use ‘we’ instead of ‘I’ to refer to the work that I have done 
with my co-authors (Laurens Rook, Sebastian Guerrero and Steef van de Velde in Chapter 
2; Clint Pennings, Laurens Rook, and Jan van Dalen in Chapters 3 and 4; Michael Becker-
Peth and Enno Siemsen in Chapter 5). 
In Chapter 2, we explore how forecast ownership affects forecasting behavior in a 
cross-functional forecasting process and how forecast combination can be used to address 
forecast biases. The functional specialization and differentiation inherent to most 
organizations usually shapes forecasting behavior in such a way that it benefits 
departmental goals and agendas. Companies often struggle with achieving cross-functional 
alignment in supply chain planning processes (Oliva & Watson, 2011) and incorporating 
the information of the demand and supply side in order to improve forecast accuracy. By 
means of an in-depth case study of a global beverage company, we were able to track two 
major change initiatives – the change in forecast ownership from the Marketing to the 
Supply Chain Department, and the introduction of a methodology that mechanically 
combined departmental forecasts into one composite forecast. This allowed us to identify 
and describe the potential benefits that these two factors may exert on the effectiveness of 
the forecasting process. Conceptually, this study combines insights from forecasting 
research with social dilemma research and agency theory. As such, it not only employs a 
relatively uncommon research methodology within the field of BOM, but it also uses 
theories to explain group dynamics within an operations management context, which so far 
has not been extensively studied in the BOM literature. 
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Chapters 3 and 4 were inspired by the findings from the case study on forecast 
ownership and forecast combination. While the strength of case studies is to build theory, 
the inability to control for many influencing factors is undoubtedly one of their limitations. 
As our case study showed, the social context and more specifically the social dilemma that 
surrounds the forecasting process may have a huge impact on people’s behavior. In order 
to examine our theoretical propositions, we (artificially) designed the social context around 
the forecasting process in two behavioral experiments to investigate inter-individual 
differences in a collaborative forecasting task. Whereas we observed three departmental 
groups in the case study (Sales, Marketing and Supply Chain), we simplified the context to 
a dyadic situation (Sales and Operations) in the experiments. 
In Chapter 3, we examine to what extent departmental affiliation within a company 
shapes forecast and negotiation behavior in forecast meetings. Using insights from social 
dilemma and negotiation research, we explored the related issue, if and to what extent the 
sometimes detrimental effect of departmental affiliation on forecast accuracy can be 
attenuated by a forecaster’s individual disposition towards cooperation and conflict. 
Taking the motivational orientation of decision-makers into account, our social 
psychological approach extends the existing work that mainly revolves around cognitive 
biases and how they affect choices and decisions (Bendoly et al., 2010). 
In Chapter 4, we extend the study detailed in Chapter 3 by examining to what 
extent a forecaster produces accurate forecasts and shares credible information depending 
on the type of incentive – that is, a departmental incentive to pursue functional goals or a 
collective incentive to pursue forecast accuracy. In addition, we argue that goal concerns 
may explain forecasting and negotiation behavior in the collaborative forecasting process. 
As such this study extends the scope of the research in BOM examining motivations and 
goal structures to define de-biasing strategies instead of identifying gaps between 
normative models and actual decision-making behavior in operations contexts. 
In Chapter 5, we return to the individual decision-maker who makes forecasts based 
on time-series data using judgment. We explore under what conditions people detect actual 
trends and inadequately react to illusionary trends. More specifically, we alter the 
components of a time-series (change, noise and trend) to specify forecast patterns that 
people exhibit under different forecast environments. We argue that besides the previously 
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identified pattern of trend damping more patterns exist and thereby, we show that the 
perception of trends in time-series data is more complex than previously thought. Table 1.2 
provides an overview of the research topics, chosen methodologies and unit of analyses in 
this dissertation. 
 
Table 1.2: Research overview 
 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 
Unit of 
analysis 
 
Groups 
 
Dyad 
 
Dyad 
 
Individual 
 
Method 
 
Case study 
 
Controlled 
experiment 
 
Controlled 
experiment 
 
Controlled 
experiment 
 
Key theme 
 
Forecast 
ownership 
Social 
motivation 
 
Goal concerns 
 
Trend detection 
 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the general findings of the studies described in the previous 
chapters. I will also relate the findings to the broader literature and highlight the main 
theoretical contributions of this dissertation. Finally, I will summarize the practical 
implications of this research for managers in forecasting processes. 
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2 Forecast ownership matters for supply chain planning: A case 
study in the beverage industry 
In this study, we explore the effects of formal ownership and forecast combination as a 
means to improve forecast performance and cross-functional collaboration. Results from 
an in-depth case study show that changes in forecast ownership improved forecast 
accuracy at the expense of undermining the relationships between the Sales, Marketing 
and Supply Chain Departments. A mechanical weighting scheme combining departmental 
forecasts into one composite forecast reduced dysfunctional behavior and improved the 
effectiveness of the entire forecasting process. We also found that feelings of ownership 
aligned the interests of the stakeholders in the presence of diverging incentives and the 
absence of formal ownership. Taken together, this leads us to conclude that assigning 
forecast ownership to the department that assumedly has the highest vested interest in 
producing accurate forecasts may improve forecast accuracy in the short-term. However, 
it cannot eliminate the systematic forecast biases to over- or under-forecast that are 
inherent in functional differentiation. Any attempt to improve forecast accuracy needs to 
consider and solve the social dilemma that decision-makers in the forecasting process 
face. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Accuracy in demand forecasts is of vital importance for organizations that face 
seasonal demand and usually have insufficient capacity to meet demand in high peak 
periods (Fair, 1989; Krane & Braun, 1991). Failing to accurately predict demand may lead 
to inadequate capacity, excess inventory, poor customer service levels, and an overall 
mismatch between supply and demand with potentially detrimental impact on a company’s 
short- and long-term profitability (Hendricks & Singhal, 2009). At the same time, demand 
forecasting is, by nature, a complicated process – because it usually includes members 
from different departments such as Marketing, Sales, Production and Operations 
(Lawrence, O'Connor, & Edmundson, 2000). Given the dispersed knowledge that may 
exist throughout the organization, and the diverging interests and incentives that shape 
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organizational behavior, the task of arriving at a consensus forecast within a company is 
highly challenging. 
Typically, forecasts generated by different departments are often based on different 
information, distinct forecasting methodologies – ranging from purely judgmental to 
statistical – and prepared on different levels of aggregation, for example on SKU (stock 
keeping unit), brand or packaging level. Successful forecasting requires coordination 
between the departments and integration of the individual forecasts into one composite 
forecast (Sanders & Ritzman, 2004). However, the functional specialization and 
differentiation usually shapes forecasting behavior in such way that it benefits 
departmental goals and agendas. Individuals often find themselves in a social dilemma in 
which they must choose between their short-term self-interest and a long-term collective 
interest (Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013), a mixed-motive situation that is 
arguably more pronounced in inter-departmental settings. Research on affective 
forecasting – that is predictions about emotional reactions to future events (Wilson & 
Gilbert, 2005) – highlights how forecasters tend to favor their own opinion over those of 
others and place higher weights on their own forecasts than statistical forecasts (Yaniv, 
2004b). Thus, companies often struggle with achieving cross-functional alignment in 
supply chain planning processes (Oliva & Watson, 2011) and incorporating the 
information of the demand and supply side in order to improve forecast accuracy. 
One way to improve the coordination of the stakeholders in the process is to assign 
a formal forecast owner who is responsible and accountable for the forecasting process and 
its outcomes. Conventional wisdom would predict that the commitment to a forecast and a 
forecasting process varies as a function of whether someone is an owner or non-owner of 
the process. Vast amounts of research on agency theory are devoted to analyzing the 
problem of incongruent interests and goals between owners (principals) and non-owners 
(agents) (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Applying insights from agency 
theory, we explore the effect of formal forecast ownership on forecasting behavior. 
Typical mechanisms, such as stock ownership, studied in agency theory do not apply to 
this supply chain planning context. We particularly examine whether, alternatively, a 
methodology to combine the departmental forecasts can align diverging interests and de-
bias dysfunctional forecasting behavior in the presence of misaligned incentives. 
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In the following section, we review the relevant literature. In Section 3 and 4, we 
describe our methodology and research site respectively. Section 5 is a chronological 
display of events which sets the stage for our propositions related to the shifting 
responsibility over the planning process, the implementation of a new forecasting 
methodology, and the commitment of non-owners in mixed-motive situations. Section 6 
presents our analysis. In the final section (Section 7), we discuss the implications of our 
findings for researchers and practitioners. 
 
2.2 Theoretical background 
Demand forecasting usually requires information from multiple sources; in fact 
forecast decisions in many organizations are made by groups (Lawrence, Goodwin, 
O'Connor, & Önkal, 2006). The multiplicity of data and sources creates two challenges. 
First, there are individual as well as political factors, that compromise the quality of 
forecasts as people knowingly or unknowingly bias their individual forecasts and hence the 
outcome of the collaborative forecasting process. Second, as the individually created 
forecasts are often based on very different information and derived using different 
forecasting methods (Clemen, 1989) there needs to be a method to reconcile those 
forecasts. 
 
2.2.1 Forecast biases 
Oliva and Watson (2009) studied a cross-functional supply chain planning process 
that was impacted by differences in goals and incentives among the functions participating 
in the planning process. The authors identified two potential sources of forecast biases – 
intentional and unintentional – that affect forecasting performance. Intentional biases were 
driven by incentive misalignment and differences in the disposition of power, whereas 
unintentional biases were driven by cognitive limitations. When different departments are 
evaluated based on different criteria and rewarded for different activities, forecasts might 
be biased in such a way to benefit one’s own agenda. For example, an Operations 
Department that is usually concerned with low inventory levels and smooth production 
might set the forecast rather low to avoid excessive stock and costly production swings 
(Shapiro, 1977). A Marketing Department, on the other hand, is concerned with market 
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share and sales. It might therefore push to inflate the forecast to have sufficient products in 
stock. Önkal, Lawrence and Sayim (2011) have experimentally examined the effect that 
differential roles may have on forecasting behavior in organizational settings. To mitigate 
those functional biases Oliva and Watson (2011) suggest a supply chain planning process 
with an independent group as the process owner and constructive engagement to align 
incentives and reduce biased forecasting behavior and hence improve planning quality. 
Just like intentional biases, unintentional biases may shape and hence affect 
predictions about the future. Research on affective forecasting has shown that people 
routinely overestimate the intensity and duration of their emotional reactions to future 
events when predicting such reactions (Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). That is, people tend to 
focus on the particular event and fail to consider other future events that may decrease the 
intensity or shorten the duration of the emotional reaction to that particular future event. 
Recently, Dane and George (2014) proposed that organizational factors, such as 
organizational prestige or the extent of team work, may also strengthen or weaken biases 
surrounding affective forecasts. Similarly, incentive systems within organizations may 
amplify these biases and lead people to focus on particular departmental goals and 
unintentionally make forecasts in line with these incentives. 
In the operations management context, biases might affect behavior in a wide 
range of tasks that involve the acquisition, processing, and interpretation of information 
from different sources. Specifically, forecasting as one operations management setting can 
be affected by the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, the confirmation bias, and 
availability heuristic resulting in systematically inaccurate predictions (Gino & Pisano, 
2008). For example, sales forecasts may be anchored on last year’s sales or a statistically 
derived prediction and decision-makers usually do not adjust this initial number enough to 
account for other factors. The confirmation bias may lead decision-makers to selectively 
search for information that is consistent with their initial belief while they may discount 
information that proves otherwise. Thus, in order to achieve predictions that are as 
accurate as possible and that are not affected by either intentional or unintentional biases, a 
forecasting process should be designed such that the impact of those biases is mitigated. 
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2.2.2 Forecast combination – judgmental and statistical 
One difficulty of supply chain planning processes is the variety of information 
and methodologies used to derive a composite forecast. Inputs from the Marketing 
function are usually based on judgmental forecasting methods, such as market surveys or 
even a gut feeling, whereas inputs from the Operations function are usually based on 
statistical techniques, such as regression models. Through the combination of both types of 
forecasts, companies can achieve significant improvements in their forecast accuracy (e.g. 
Clemen, 1989; Makridakis & Winkler, 1983). 
A number of methodologies have been proposed to integrate different forecasts 
(Armstrong, 2001). The combining of forecasts from different sources can be done in 
group discussions or mechanically using either averages or weighting schemes. When 
decision-makers combine their opinions in group discussions in order to improve accuracy, 
several factors influence the integration of several opinions, such as the perceived accuracy 
of another source or the extent of agreement with one’s own judgment (Yaniv, 2004a). 
When forecasts are mechanically combined, past research has shown that using equal 
weights produces accurate forecasts for many types of forecasting (Clemen, 1989). 
Moreover, a study by Winkler (1967) showed that using weights based on past forecast 
accuracies did not outperform using equal weights. On the other hand, there is some 
evidence that using previous performance to determine the weights can produce more 
accurate forecasts (e.g. Lobo, 1991; Shamseldin, O'Connor, & Liang, 1997). However, 
most of these studies are void of organizational contexts with diverging incentives that bias 
forecasting behavior. 
Unlike previous studies that evaluated these methodologies based on forecast 
accuracy, Sanders and Ritzman (2004) propose human factors, such as perception of 
forecast credibility and forecast ownership; and organizational factors, such as the location 
of final forecast generation to evaluate how well each integration methodology performs 
beyond forecast accuracy. Although the authors do not explicitly define ownership, they 
do refer to the ability to influence the composite forecast. While there is hardly any 
research on ownership in the forecasting literature, vast research on agency theory analyses 
the problems of incongruent interests of principals and agents (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). 
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2.2.3 Ownership in agency theory 
In agency theory, the relationship between shareholders (principals) and managers 
(agents) is defined as “a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 5). 
The problem that arises from that relationship is a potential conflict of interests and goals 
of the principal and agent – hence the agent may not behave in line with the principal’s 
desires (Eisenhardt, 1989). To overcome this problem, agency theory is concerned with 
defining appropriate contracts and incentives, such as bonuses, profit sharing, or stock 
ownership options that align the interests of the principal and the agent (Ang, Cole, & Lin, 
2000; Brown, Sturman, & Simmering, 2003; Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, & Carpenter, 
2010). 
In supply chain planning processes, there are no shareholders and managers as 
defined in the principal agent relationship. However, of those stakeholders who are 
involved in the planning process, there is usually one who is assigned with a formal 
ownership of the process, asserts certain rights and responsibilities within the process, and 
is accountable for the outcome of the process. On the other hand, the non-owning 
stakeholders without explicit rights and accountability indirectly exert influence by 
providing information and making forecast decisions that serve as input to the composite 
forecast. Similar to the principal agent problem, the interests and goals of the different 
stakeholders in the process are not aligned. The fundamental difference though is that the 
design of contracts or introduction of bonuses and stock ownership options are no means 
to align the stakeholders in the process. This begs into question how forecast ownership 
affects forecasting behavior in general and how forecast combination can be used to align 
the interests of the Supply Chain, Marketing and Sales Departments in the presence of 
diverging incentives? 
 
2.3 Methodology 
This paper presents an exploratory case study with the aim of understanding how 
forecast ownership affects forecasting behavior. A case study is “an empirical research that 
primarily uses contextually rich data from bounded real-world settings to investigate a 
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focused phenomenon” (Barratt, Choi, & Li, 2011, p. 329). A single case study is the 
preferred research strategy when there is limited existing theory that describes the 
phenomenon, and variables – including the relationships between them – that are not yet 
very well defined (Meredith, 1998; Stuart, McCutcheon, Handfield, McLachlin, & 
Samson, 2002; Voss, Tsikriktsis, & Frohlich, 2002). In this research, we selected a case 
company in the beverage industry (see below). Our rationale for doing so was that the 
concept of forecast ownership is not very well developed in the literature – essentially, 
there is a lack of research investigating how to address forecasting biases of functional 
areas. Moreover, the single case also enabled us to study the surrounding context of the 
forecasting process in detail over a period of time and to reflect on the effects of two major 
change initiatives in retrospect (Barratt et al., 2011; Voss et al., 2002). 
 
2.3.1 Research site 
Our research site, BevCo (the company’s real name has been changed) is a global 
beverage company with €2.6 billion in sales and an operating income of €324 million in 
2009. It has 84 plants and more than 37,000 employees worldwide. The company produces 
natural and flavored waters and is active in a very dynamic fast moving consumer goods 
(FMCG) industry determined by high seasonality and volatility. This is clearly reflected in 
BevCo’s product range including products with long as well as short product life cycles. 
BevCo produces natural carbonated and non-carbonated waters, which are functional 
products with long life cycles (Fisher, 1997). Within the flavored waters, a variety of 
flavors is available, such as orange, grapefruit, and apple, and consumers can choose from 
sugar-free and vitamin-enriched drinks. In addition to the regular flavors, the company 
also launches seasonal flavors that only have a product life cycle of six months. All 
products are available in various formats (i.e., 0.5, 1.0 and 1.5 liter bottles). 
BevCo is represented worldwide by country business units (CBUs). For our case 
study, we focused on a CBU in Latin America where BevCo has been the market leader 
for years. This CBU belonged to the top three in terms of the growth of BevCo worldwide 
and was among the top 10 CBUs generating the highest sales. In 2009, the CBU had €250 
million in sales with an operating income of €35 million. The business of this particular 
CBU was growing rapidly throughout the period of our study with an annual growth of 
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about 20 percent (taking the entire product range into account) and approximately 50 
percent for the flavored waters. 
Within its market, the high volatility and seasonality heavily influenced the 
CBU’s operations. Consumer demand for new tastes and formats was constantly changing 
and was very unpredictable, especially for the more innovative products with short product 
life cycles. In 2009, the CBU had approximately 70 SKUs in total. Every year, 10 to 15 
SKUs were added due to new product launches (for example, a new flavor) or changes in 
packaging (for example, change in label or format). BevCo had a seasonal business as 
consumption depended on the temperature, especially in Latin America. Sales during the 
summer season were – and still are – almost twice as high as during winter due to the 
extremely high temperatures that led to peak consumption, especially in densely populated 
metropolitan areas that accounted for more than 50 percent of the sales. 
For the present research, the case of the Latin American CBU was particularly 
relevant because two events took place at the time of our study that directly impacted 
forecast accuracy. First, forecast ownership changed, which rendered the research site a 
revelatory case (Yin, 2009) to offer insights about a phenomenon which was previously 
inaccessible to a scientific inquiry. Second, a new forecasting methodology to combine 
departmental forecasts into one composite forecast was introduced. Therefore, this case 
also extends and generalizes the findings of a similar study by Oliva and Watson (2011) to 
another industry. Both initiatives – the change in forecast ownership and the introduction 
of the new forecasting methodology – helped improve forecast accuracy, but had different 
effects (which will be discussed in greater detail below). 
 
2.3.2 Data collection 
For the present research, we applied two types of triangulation, data triangulation 
and investigator triangulation (Denzin, 1989) as a strategy to improve the validity and 
reliability of our case study findings (Stuart et al., 2002). Data triangulation refers to the 
use of different data sources, while investigator triangulation refers to the use of different 
researchers to detect or minimize biases resulting from the researcher as a person (Flick, 
2009). At the data collection stage, we used and combined various primary and secondary 
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sources of company information. This enabled us to obtain data on different levels while 
addressing the same problem. 
Thus, we interviewed different stakeholders of the process – three demand 
planners who were responsible for the forecasting process at three different points in time: 
Demand planner 1 had been with BevCo for 1.5 years before assuming the position from 
June 2007 to April 2009. During this time, the ownership of the forecasting process 
changed from the Marketing Department to the Supply Chain Department. Interestingly, 
this demand planner moved into a Sales role afterwards and provided us with insights into 
both perspectives. Demand planner 2 had worked as a raw material and packaging 
procurement planner for two years before taking over the role as the demand planner from 
May 2009 to December 2010. During this time, the new forecasting methodology was 
implemented. Demand planner 3 had worked in Purchasing and Procurement for almost 
three years before becoming the demand planner from January 2011 to June 2012. During 
this time, the forecasting methodology continued to be used. We also interviewed the 
planning manager who was in charge of the overall planning process including production 
planning, forecasting, and material planning from December 2007 to May 2011, and who 
had also been with BevCo since 2002. 
To establish reliability (Yin, 2009), we had an explicit interview protocol 
developed before conducting the interviews (see Appendix A for an example). The aim of 
the interviews was to document how the planning process at BevCo had evolved, to 
understand how the process was perceived by different stakeholders and what the reasons 
were for particular behaviors that affected the forecast and the process. The interviews 
lasted from 30 to 90 minutes. We assured interviewees that the results would stay 
anonymous in order to facilitate open communication. Our main informant was 
interviewed several times; he was the Demand Planner 2 who initiated and led the change 
in the forecasting methodology. All interviews were conducted in English, face to face or 
via telephone. The interviews were semi-structured and allowed interviewees to explore 
topics that they considered relevant. We used follow-up emails to clarify some answers. 
All interviews were recorded, transcribed for data analysis, and sent back to the 
interviewees for verification. 
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Likewise, we accessed various sources of company information to complement 
the interviews. We studied archival material, such as process descriptions, organization 
charts, company and industry reports, worksheets, and presentation slides. Interestingly, 
we were allowed to use the results of an unpublished in-company survey that was 
conducted at the beginning of 2010. This survey provided us with an insight into how the 
forecasting process was perceived by the stakeholders from the Supply Chain, Marketing 
and Sales Departments at that time. The survey revealed how people judged the 
collaboration among the departments and how motivated they were to change to a new 
process. This enabled us to collect data from a wider sample of respondents that we did not 
have direct access to (Voss et al., 2002).  
Importantly, we were also allowed access to the original forecast bias and 
accuracy data for the entire CBU for the eight most important brands for the period 
between January 2007 and August 2012. For the time period following the implementation 
of the new forecasting methodology (May to November 2010), we received more detailed 
data about the forecast, actual sales levels, forecast bias and accuracy for each of the three 
departments (Sales, Marketing, and Supply Chain) as well as the combined forecast for the 
10 most important brands and all bottled products combined. This enabled us to conduct 
supplementary quantitative analyses examining the impact of the change in ownership and 
new forecasting methodology on the forecasting bias and forecast accuracy of each 
department and the CBU in total. As such, the quantitative data represented a different 
source of information to corroborate the findings from the interviews. 
 
2.3.3 Data analysis 
An inductive approach was followed for coding and analysis (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). The coding technique we used is described in Strauss and Corbin (1990) and has 
been used in operations management research before (e.g. Barratt & Barratt, 2011; 
Karlsson, Nellore, & Soderquist, 1998; Wu & Pagell, 2011). Generally, collected data is 
written up, reviewed, and labels are generated for segments of text which are further 
reviewed and refined into more abstract categories. We started the coding process by 
reading through all of the material, identifying fragments of text that provided insights into 
ownership, the perception of the cross-functional interface and forecasting process, and the 
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behavior of involved stakeholders. This served as a first basis for developing a coding 
protocol. The categories that emerged revolved around themes that were explicitly 
mentioned by interviewees and survey respondents. After multiple iterations, some 
categories with substantial thematic overlap were refined into 23 thematic attributes. 
Appendix B features the labels, our operational definition and a sample text from our data 
for some of the key themes. 
Using the qualitative data analysis software package NVivo 9.0, we coded the 
entire text material based on the coding protocol. Two researchers independently coded the 
data in order to minimize researcher bias during the analysis stage, another use of 
triangulation to improve the quality of our research. We relied on Cohen’s kappa (Cohen, 
1960) to assess inter-rater reliability. Contrary to other reliability measures, this statistic 
corrects for chance agreement and does not inflate the reliability score; kappa ranges from 
1 to – 1, with 1 indicating perfect agreement and 0 indicating chance agreement. We 
obtained an inter-rater reliability of 0.74, which is good (Cicchetti, 1994), especially in 
light of the observation made by Boyer and Verma (2000) that an initial standard of 0.60 is 
an acceptable level of inter-rater agreement in the operations strategy literature given the 
lack of established standards in this field. 
 
2.4 Case Context 
As a beverage company, BevCo operated in the fast moving consumer goods 
industry. The Latin American CBU under study not only faced the challenges typical for 
FMCG companies, but also dealt with dynamics that were specific to the Latin American 
market. Most notably, the high volatility and seasonality of the demand and supply side 
determined the CBU’s operations and need for accurate demand forecasts. 
 
2.4.1 Demand dynamics 
As typical of the FMCG industry, competition was severe due to the large number 
of national and international competitors that were established in the Latin American 
market at the time, including private labels that were entering the market with the intention 
to steal market share by offering lower prices. At the same time, several market trends 
emerged that the CBU had to satisfy to stay competitive. Specifically, an increasing 
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awareness of health issues and changing lifestyles impacted the company’s product range. 
That is, flavored waters had been positioned as healthier alternatives to soft drinks and 
hence the CBU frequently introduced new products to keep up with the changing taste of 
consumers. Similarly, the labeling and packaging greatly contributed to a consumer’s 
decision to purchase a product. The CBU, therefore, needed to invest in innovations 
surrounding the labels and bottles. 
Another factor contributing to high volatility was the importance of promotions. 
Capturing and estimating the impact of promotions on the CBU’s sales, however, was a 
challenging task due to this very complex business environment, in which several factors 
affected consumer demand. In any case, over-forecasting demand could lead to an 
oversupply of products and under-forecasting could lead to shortages, both of which were 
unfavorable situations producing either obsolescence or stock-out costs. 
Besides general market trends, seasonality heavily impacted product demand and 
influenced the CBU’s entire planning process. High temperatures, especially during the 
summer season, could rapidly increase consumption. Furthermore, some of the new 
products were introduced only as a seasonal flavor during certain months of the year. 
Planning, purchasing of components (for example, fruit juice) and production were usually 
finished well in advance. Again, inaccurate forecasts could lead to an over- or undersupply 
situation. 
Finally, demand for BevCo’s products in this CBU was also affected by the 
governmental control over price increments, which was a specific characteristic of Latin 
America. As the prices for the raw material moved together with oil prices, this external 
control affected the company’s profits. 
 
2.4.2 Supply dynamics 
On the supply side, the seasonality impacted the CBU’s production. Production 
was handled by four factories in the country owned by the CBU and some third-party 
manufacturers for the packaging component. BevCo could not produce all of its demand 
during the peak season, because capacity constraints made it difficult to react flexibly to 
seasonal demand patterns. At the same time, most of the products were perishable and 
shelf life was part of BevCo’s service contract with retailers. For example, for still waters, 
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the shelf life was usually 12 months, whereas for flavored waters, it was six months. 
Hence, fluctuating demand could not easily be satisfied by either increasing production 
capacity or plenty of safety stock as products could not be put in stock for a long period of 
time. 
The raw materials were sourced from mainly Latin America and a few Overseas 
suppliers. An increase in the price of raw materials, such as PET for producing bottles, put 
a lot of pressure on BevCo’s total cost price. The success of the CBU also depended to a 
large extent on how well it utilized its plants and how well it forecasted resource 
requirements. As it was very expensive to invest in new manufacturing facilities, there was 
a large amount of pressure on the existing capacity utilization. Moreover, it was critical to 
accurately forecast not only volumes but also the specific mix of SKUs (for instance, the 
different flavors), because the deals with the component suppliers were closed once every 
year. In other words, if the flavor forecast was inaccurate, BevCo ran the risk of having too 
little fruit juice for production, risking an undersupply situation. 
Finally, distribution contributed to the high volatility. The CBU primarily sold its 
products through distributors (50 percent of sales) and retailers (20 percent of sales). The 
remaining 30 percent of sales targeted small neighborhood outlets that are very typical in 
Latin American countries. They amounted to up to 25,000 points of sale throughout the 
whole country. This channel required a large sales force and a complex logistics network 
to serve those businesses, but it was also the most profitable as there were no further 
intermediaries. However, with sales going through distributors, lead times and order 
variation were increased while total chain stock visibility was reduced. That made 
planning and fulfilling consumer demand very difficult. 
In sum, given the high volatility and seasonality of BevCo’s business, accurate 
forecasts were of vital importance to fulfill demand and keeping costs low. Too high or too 
low a demand forecast could lead to over- or under-supply, respectively. The CBU 
struggled with forecast inaccuracies which had severe effects on its operations. In order to 
understand the forecasting behavior of the different stakeholders in the forecasting process 
that led to over- and under-forecast situations, it is important to take the organizational 
context into account. 
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2.4.3 Organizational context 
BevCo’s Supply Chain, Marketing and Sales Departments differed considerably 
with regard to their responsibilities, objectives, and orientation. The Supply Chain 
Department managed the planning of demand, raw materials and production, and was 
responsible for transport and distribution. The Marketing Department was responsible for 
generating demand in the market, hence served as the direct link to the consumers through 
advertising and promotions. Marketing also defined pricing strategies and decided which 
products to launch or discontinue. The Sales Department served to persuade customers, for 
example, retailers to buy BevCo’s products and fulfill customer needs, and was split into 
Sales Planning and Sales Execution. 
These different tasks and responsibilities influenced the departments’ priorities, 
planning horizons and incentives and also determined each department’s attitude towards 
forecasting in general and its own forecasting behavior in particular. A summary is 
provided in Table 2.1. As the Supply Chain Department was partly compensated based on 
forecast performance, forecast accuracy was its most important KPI (key performance 
indicator). It aimed for accurate forecasts in order to lower stock levels and stabilize 
production knowing the impact that forecast accuracy had on service levels, inventory 
levels and write-offs. The Marketing Department was compensated based on brand yearly 
sales, brand market share and profitability, and brand operating contribution. Hence, 
Marketing was interested in bringing products to the market and ensuring high product 
availability. Enthusiastic sales projections and inflated demand forecast were Marketing’s 
means of ensuring high inventory levels to avoid stock-outs, while predicting high demand 
would also justify its investments in promotional activities. For the Sales Department part 
of the variable salary depended on the achievement of a sales target, which was set with 
the forecast as an anchor. This led Sales to deflate the forecast in order to receive a less 
challenging sales target. 
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Table 2.1: Functional comparison 
 Supply Chain Marketing Sales 
Priorities Low stock levels 
Stable production 
SKU level 
Incentivize 
consumption (end 
consumers) 
Fulfill sales volume 
objective 
(customers) 
Brand level 
Horizon Medium to long-
term 
Long-term Short-term 
Incentive Forecast accuracy Brand performance Sales target 
Bias Conservative Positive Negative 
Forecast creation Historic sales data 
& regression models 
Judgmental Judgmental & 
statistical 
Tools Excel 
Forecasting 
software 
Powerpoint Excel 
 
Consequently, the functional differentiation created natural tensions between the 
three departments, even in the pursuit of a collaborative forecasting process. The need for 
accurate forecasts, combined with the incentive landscape, created a mixed motive 
situation in which the aim of accurate forecasts was at odds with the aim of achieving 
personal (departmental) goals and incentives. This did not only pose a great challenge at 
aligning Supply Chain, Marketing and Sales, but also led to conflicts among the three 
departments. The emphasis on functional objectives represents a silo-oriented approach to 
managing the supply chain, which may subsequently be rooted in the incentive landscape 
of the organization. Similarly, an individual’s problem solving approach may contribute to 
a narrow or broad focus and hence to the decisions that are primarily concerned with 
satisfying individual or overall objectives respectively (Cantor & Macdonald, 2009). In the 
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CBU’s situation, the three different departments locally optimized their individual 
incentives while underestimating the impact that their forecasting behavior would have on 
the other parties. 
 
2.5 The Planning Process 
As described above, the planning process and an accurate demand forecast were of 
vital importance for the company due to the high volatility and seasonality of demand and 
a huge share of sales going through distributors. Demand seasonality posed a major 
challenge because the company did not have sufficient capacity to meet demand during the 
high season and had to anticipate stocks and plan capacity early to satisfy demand when it 
peaked. At the same time, perishable products became obsolete and the longer they were 
kept in stock, the shorter their shelf life that could be offered to customers. The use of 
distributors increased the lead times and order variation, which tended to increase when 
moving up the supply chain, a phenomenon known as the bullwhip effect (Lee, 
Padmanabhan, & Whang, 2004). It also decreased the stock visibility throughout the entire 
supply chain. The planning process at BevCo changed twice within a two year period to 
address the problems of inaccurate forecasts and lack of cross-functional collaboration. 
Initially the ownership of the forecasting process changed and later a new forecasting 
methodology was introduced. Both initiatives had very differential effects on the 
forecasting behavior and process, as will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
2.5.1 The early forecasting process (2007 – 2009) 
In the beginning, the Marketing Department created a monthly forecast based on 
their knowledge of the market. That forecast was communicated to the Supply Chain 
Planning Department which then created the production and procurement plans based on 
that forecast. No further adjustment of the forecast was made. Given Marketing’s 
objectives and their sales projections, the forecast was usually higher than actual demand 
and led to forecast accuracies that sometimes fell to below 70 percent. Because of this low 
accuracy, BevCo had very high inventory levels, while at the same time service levels 
were well below the target. This resulted in high obsolescence costs, as the products had to 
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be written off when they were too close to the expiry date and could no longer be sold to 
customers. 
In April 2008, the general manager assigned the responsibility of the forecast to 
Supply Chain. The goal of this initiative was to achieve better forecast accuracy leading to 
higher service levels and lower inventory levels. The forecasting process followed a 
monthly planning cycle: each week certain actions were required or meetings took place. 
In Week 1, Supply Chain created an initial forecast based on the information it had 
received from Marketing and Sales. In Week 2, the Marketing and Sales Departments 
created their demand forecasts separately in preparation for the forecast review meeting in 
Week 3. This forecast review meeting was attended by the Marketing and Supply Chain 
Planning Departments (as before), but now also the Sales Planning Department took part 
in the meeting. During that meeting, discrepancies between the three separate forecasts 
from Supply Chain, Marketing and Sales were discussed in order to decide on one 
consensus forecast, and thereby reducing the impact of potentially too high or low 
forecasts from the Marketing and Sales Departments, respectively.  
This meeting sometimes lasted an entire day and involved serious negotiations to 
reach a consensus forecast. The outcome of the discussion was heavily influenced by 
personal interests and the relative power of the attendees (in terms of persuasive power and 
seniority). For example, if the Marketing Department sent a junior brand manager to the 
forecast review meeting, it was more difficult for this manager to convince a more senior 
Sales manager that the consensus forecast should be higher. Participants in the meeting 
also changed from one month to the next due to internal company dynamics (for example, 
job rotations). The focus of this forecast review meeting was on the short-term, reviewing 
the forecast for the next month and sometimes the forecasts for the coming two or three 
months in order to first solve the pressing operational issues. 
The consensus forecast was taken as an input for the Sales and Operations Planning 
(S&OP) meeting that took place in Week 4. In this S&OP meeting, the board of directors 
decided on the final forecast. In most cases, the directors changed the consensus forecast. 
However, at that time, the focus of the S&OP meeting was very short-term oriented 
addressing mainly capacity and supply issues. The S&OP meeting lacked senior 
involvement as not all directors were committed to participate in that meeting. The main 
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participants were the Supply Chain Planning manager, the Purchasing director and 
Production Planning manager, whereas there was very low attendance from the Sales or 
Marketing directors. Figure 2.1 provides an overview of the forecasting process at this 
early stage. 
The forecast review meetings became ineffective due to the constant tension and 
conflict between all three parties trying to resolve the differences between the forecasts 
that were biased in opposite directions (with Marketing over-forecasting and Sales under-
forecasting). This was the state of affairs when a demand planner took over the position in 
2009. In the next section, we will describe how the new demand planner dealt with this 
problematic situation. 
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2.5.2 Transition to a new forecasting methodology 
The demand planner who took over this position in May 2009 initiated a new 
forecasting methodology in April 2010 to formalize the forecasting process and address 
the forecast biases and improve forecast accuracy. The new demand planner first received 
senior support from the planning manager who was in charge of the overall planning 
process. However, as the buy-in of all functional groups was a necessary condition for the 
forecasting process to work, a top-down change would not have been successful. For this 
very reason, a survey was carried out with relevant stakeholders to, first of all, understand 
the different perspectives and how the current process was perceived, and to raise 
awareness of the need for a change.  
In this survey, respondents were asked to indicate how satisfied they were with the 
current forecasting process. The survey addressed five themes: transparency of the process, 
performance of the process, commitment to the process, others’ commitment to the 
process, and orientation towards continuous improvement. The survey revealed that the 
satisfaction with the existing process was very low whereas the willingness to change the 
process was very high as can be seen in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: Radar chart of stakeholder survey results 
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The survey also included open-ended questions where respondents could give their 
general opinion about the process. An example of a Marketing manager was as follows: 
“There is no standard template to create the forecast and to feed the inputs into the 
process. There is no knowledge about the methods used by the other departments to 
bring the number to the meeting. We fight to reach the number!” 
Similarly, a Sales manager noted: 
“We are not very quick to reach consensus. We fight a lot. It’s obvious that our 
positions are very biased in opposite directions because of the different interests. In 
the end, it’s a very subjective way of arriving at the forecast number. We lack some 
sort of standardization.” 
The new forecasting methodology would need to address the concerns raised in the 
survey. Thus, the demand planner proceeded with the implementation of a new mechanical 
weighting scheme to create a more objective way of reaching the consensus forecasts and 
thereby reducing the propensity for particular forecast biases and the conflict around each 
department’s forecasting behavior. 
 
2.5.3 The new forecasting methodology 
In the new process, information sharing became more structured. Marketing, Sales, 
and Supply Chain had to write their individual forecasts in a shared database in Week 1. 
No-one had access to the other’s inputs before entering the forecast to avoid manipulating 
and biasing the forecast on purpose. An interesting feature of the new forecasting 
methodology was that the assumptions upon which the forecasts were based also had to be 
shared in the database. These were, for example, promotion plans, new product launches, 
anticipated special events in the future or stock levels of distributors. This was intended to 
increase the transparency of the information needed to make an accurate forecast. 
In Week 2, the departmental forecasts were combined into one forecast using a 
spread sheet as a tool. The individual forecasts of the three departments were weighted 
according to their past average accuracy during the previous six months. This was the most 
prominent difference in the new forecasting process: the structured method to objectively 
determine the combined forecast instead of negotiating the final figure. The more accurate 
a departmental forecast had been in the past, the larger the weight that this particular 
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department would have in the forecast for the following month. While Supply Chain and 
Marketing were forecasting on SKU level, Sales forecasted on brand level, which had to 
be taken into account when calculating the final forecast on SKU level. Table 2.2 provides 
an example of how the separate forecasts were combined into the final forecast. 
 
Table 2.2: Methodology to combine departmental forecasts 
Brand 
Average forecast 
accuracy 
Weighting Forecast source 
SC MKT SAL SC MKT SAL SC MKT SAL Comb 
A 98% 96% 97% 36% 29% 35% 20,000 20,500 20,300 20,248 
B 94% 94% 93% 35% 36% 29% 15,500 14,355 15,000 14,947 
 
The results of this forecast combination were discussed in the forecast review 
meeting in Week 3 before they were communicated again as input for the S&OP meeting 
that took place in the Week 4 and was intended for the same participants as before. Figure 
2.3 provides an overview of the new forecasting process. 
With the new methodology to combine the departmental forecasts, the forecast 
review meetings started to change. First of all, the spread sheet tool provided the 
discrepancy between the highest and lowest of the three departmental forecasts. Only if 
this discrepancy was too large, the forecasts and their underlying assumptions were 
discussed, otherwise the objectively combined forecast was automatically accepted. This 
meant that there was more time available to also discuss more medium- and long-term 
strategic issues, as most of the serious discussions around the forecast were eliminated by 
this new approach. Secondly, the forecast performance of each department as well as 
overall (company) forecast performance of the previous months were shown and discussed 
during the meetings. This did not only facilitate learning, but it also increased transparency 
as well as accountability. Hence, the new forecasting methodology to objectively combine 
departmental forecasts into one consensus forecast based on past forecast accuracy solved 
the mixed-motive situation in which the aim of accurate forecasts was at odds with 
individual (departmental) goals. 
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2.6 Case Study Findings 
In this section, we present our findings that complement the descriptive 
documentation of the planning process in the previous section. 
 
2.6.1 The effect of formal forecast ownership 
The first step in improving forecast accuracy was to assign the ownership of the 
forecasting process to the Supply Chain Department. By forecast ownership, we refer to a 
formal claim of ownership of the forecasting process. As such, the construct of forecast 
ownership can be distinguished from other types of formal ownership systems that provide 
equity possession to employees, such as the employee stock ownership plan (Toscano, 
1983). Forecast ownership further refers to the planning and control over the forecasting 
process and its outcomes. A forecast owner is responsible for managing the process and 
synthesizing data (Oliva & Watson, 2009), but also for disseminating information to 
stakeholders of the process, and monitoring the performance of the process and adjusting 
it, if necessary. The owner thus bares the ultimate responsibility of the forecast. The 
location of forecast ownership varies in organizations as owners may be the Logistics, 
Sales, Marketing, Procurement or Production Department (Adebanjo & Mann, 2000). 
Also, cross-functional ownership has been discussed in the literature (Davis & Mentzer, 
2007), but it merely refers to the development of a consensus forecast – that is to say, 
coming to an agreement among different stakeholders who can then be held accountable 
for this agreement. 
The change in formal forecast ownership from the Marketing to Supply Chain 
Department at BevCo had two major consequences. First, the forecast performance 
improved dramatically. Before the change in ownership, average forecast accuracy (1 – 
ABS[sales-forecast]/forecast) from January 2007 until March 2008 was 81 percent. After 
the change in ownership, forecast accuracy increased to on average 88 percent, whereas 
forecast bias (sales/forecast) decreased from on average 7 percent to 2 percent. However, 
there was also a downside to the change in forecast ownership. While forecast 
performance improved due to the leading role of Supply Chain, the conflict between the 
three departments increased, especially between the Sales and Marketing Departments. 
The consensus forecast was often mistrusted and second-guessed when the plan was 
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communicated in other functional meetings. Tension could also be observed in the 
commitment of participants who failed to provide input to the forecast review meeting on 
time. A Supply Chain manager described the resulting conflict as follows: 
“We became more like the enemy rather than a partner for Sales and especially for 
Marketing, because we would be challenging the forecast all the time and we would 
arrive to a forecast all the time that they didn’t feel was their own forecast. So, we 
lost their commitment in the process. They would not feel that we were partners. 
They would feel more like we were enemies.” 
This lack of alignment and coordination started to jeopardize the entire planning 
process. That is, the change in ownership structure for the sake of accuracy improved 
performance, but had a detrimental effect on the relationships and commitment to the 
process. This leads to our first proposition regarding the effect of forecast ownership on 
forecasting behavior: 
Proposition I. Shifting forecast ownership from one department to another can improve 
forecast accuracy. This effect does not occur through a change in actual forecasting 
behavior, but through the ultimate decision-making authority of the owner. Forecast 
accuracy under such circumstances improves at the expense of losing commitment from 
the non-owner(s). 
 
2.6.2 The effect of a new forecasting methodology 
The new forecasting methodology that mechanically combined the departmental 
forecasts into one composite forecast according to a weighting scheme based on past 
accuracies was key to aligning the diverging interests and goals of the stakeholders in the 
process. When BevCo started adopting this new methodology, the three departments 
needed to jointly get used to the new process, which caused an initial drop in forecast 
accuracy in April 2010. Afterwards, however, the forecasting performance continued to 
improve despite an increase in SKUs and the growing complexity of the business and 
market situation. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show a steady decrease in overall forecast bias and 
increase in forecast accuracy, respectively. Interestingly, the range of the forecast also 
became narrower, hence the variability and predictability of the forecast improved 
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substantially, which made the overall forecasting process and entire supply chain more 
stable and robust. 
The methodology to combine the three departmental forecasts eliminated the 
forecast bias that was generally observed in the company – that is, Marketing’s tendency to 
over-forecast and Sales’ tendency to under-forecast. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 compare the 
forecast accuracy and forecast bias per functional area with the combined forecast for all 
bottled drinks across all brands after the implementation of the new forecasting 
methodology. As can be seen, forecast accuracy increased and forecast bias decreased. The 
combined forecast did not necessarily outperform each individual forecasts, but 
represented an objectively calculated compromise. 
 
Figure 2.4: Forecast bias 
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Figure 2.5: Forecast accuracy 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Accuracy of departmental and combined forecasts 
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Figure 2.7: Bias of departmental and combined forecast 
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Proposition II. A simple weighting scheme for the mathematical combination of 
judgmental and statistical forecasts based on past performance can increase forecast 
accuracy and reduce the structural forecasting bias inherent in functional differentiation. 
Another noteworthy result of the new forecasting methodology, which was not 
anticipated at the time of the implementation, was that the focus of the forecast review as 
well as S&OP meeting changed from short- to long-term orientation. Whereas, previously, 
mainly supply and capacity issues were discussed, the agenda now included topics such as 
new product launches, process improvement, business opportunities and the adherence to 
financial plans. The Planning manager described this unanticipated shift as follows: 
“The demand review meeting really changed to a less conflict-laden meeting. And, 
of course, because of this, the same happened to the S&OP meeting. You have less 
subjectivity, less conflicts, and finally when you started to see results, everyone was 
saying: ‘Don't discuss about the number. Let's believe in the process. Let's focus on 
the drivers. And let's focus on the P'n'L [profit and loss]. And let's focus on all the 
type of things, and not whether the forecast is 105 or 110.’ So, there was more 
added value of the meetings.” 
Our interviews revealed not only changes in actual forecasting behavior, but also in 
motivation after the implementation of the new forecasting methodology. We observed an 
increase in the commitment and engagement of the three departments. Whereas, during the 
early planning process the meetings lacked attendance, people now actively prepared and 
participated in the meetings. Especially the attendance, engagement and commitment of 
the Sales and Marketing directors in the S&OP meeting improved, essentially because now 
it had become more relevant for them. Whereas before the commitment to the forecasting 
process varied as a function of whether someone was a formal owner of the process or 
simply participating in the process, the non-owning participants now showed similar 
commitment without being assigned a formal form of ownership. 
With the implementation of the new forecasting methodology, also the Marketing 
and Sales Departments felt that they had an influence on the final forecast. Whereas, 
people were previously dissatisfied with the final forecast because it was sometimes 
overruled and changed after the forecast review meeting, they now felt that they had a 
“voice in the decision-making process”. This was in sharp contrast to what a senior brand 
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manager noted before the implementation: “I am not ok with the change of volumes in 
S&OP because all the previous analysis of hours that one does is just a waste of time.” As 
the new forecasting methodology was also more transparent than before, everyone now 
had access to the information, and the assumptions behind the forecasts were openly 
discussed and evaluated. It also helped the Marketing and Sales Departments, who were 
previously less familiar with forecasting, to understand the consequences of inaccurate 
forecasts. Having more information and better knowledge about the forecasts enabled the 
Marketing and Sales Departments to develop feelings of ownership toward the forecast. 
Albeit not formally rewarded for participating in the forecasting process and providing 
accurate and timely input to the forecast review meeting, the Marketing and Sales 
Departments invested more time and energy into the forecasting process. All three 
departments now complied with procedures and perceived each others’ forecasts as more 
credible than before the implementation of the new forecasting methodology. The above 
examples suggest that the new forecasting methodology fostered ways for feelings of 
ownership to emerge. Therefore, our third proposition states: 
Proposition III. Involvement of the non-owning departments in the forecasting process 
can be achieved without assigning formal ownership and without changing formal 
incentives. 
 
2.7 Discussion 
The purpose of the present research was to explore how forecast ownership and 
forecast combination can address forecast biases that are rooted in functional 
differentiation and incentive misalignment. By tracking two major change initiatives – the 
change in forecast ownership from the Marketing to the Supply Chain Department, and the 
introduction of a methodology that mechanically combined departmental forecasts into one 
composite forecast – we identified and described the potential benefits that these two 
factors may exert on the effectiveness of the forecasting process. Focusing on forecast 
ownership, we addressed an element of the forecasting process that was up until now 
largely ignored in the forecasting literature. By examining how well a forecasting 
methodology can address forecast biases and cross-functional conflict, we assessed the 
effectiveness of a forecasting process using evaluation criteria in addition to accuracy. 
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Our findings revealed that although the change in ownership led to an initial 
improvement in forecast accuracy, it had detrimental effects on the relationships between 
the functional areas involved in the planning process. It not only enhanced the 
organizational conflict rooted in functional differentiation, but also jeopardized the 
efficiency and credibility of the overall planning process. This highlights how a sole focus 
on improving forecast accuracy can backfire and create new, unforeseen problems. The 
change in forecasting methodology, on the other hand, with a more holistic focus on 
tackling the forecast biases of the functional areas, solved the conflict and led to a robust 
and credible process, producing accurate forecasts despite the continuing existence of 
diverging functional incentives. Furthermore, the study highlights how the involvement of 
those departments, that have no formal ownership over the forecast, can align the interests 
of owners and non-owners in the presence of diverging incentives and an absence of 
formal forecast ownership. 
 
2.7.1 Theoretical implications 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, considerable research 
on behavioral forecasting focuses on the individual making the forecast (Lawrence et al., 
2006). In many organizations though, the task of agreeing on a final composite forecast is 
often a cross-functional team effort. However, one of the dangers here (and in reality) is 
that of mixed motives (Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). In our study, we 
indeed found misaligned incentives and behavior on an individual as well as group level 
that endangered the cooperative forecasting process, such as the reluctance to share 
information, lack of commitment, and opportunistic behavior to pursue departmental goals 
rather than company-wide goals. Researchers have started to conceptualize supply chain 
alliances between firms as social dilemmas to explain why some alliances fail while others 
succeed (McCarter & Northcraft, 2007). Our study extends this line of research by 
focusing on intra-firm cooperation in the context of a collaborative forecasting process, 
and shows that social dilemma research not only helps understand supply chain 
partnerships between firms (e.g. McCarter & Kamal, 2013), but also supply chain 
collaborations within firms. Any attempt to improve forecast accuracy needs to consider 
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the effect that differential roles have on forecasting behavior and solve the social dilemma 
that decision-makers in the forecasting process face.  
In this study, we explored one such attempt, the new methodology to mechanically 
combine departmental forecasts into one composite forecast. We showed that a simple 
weighting scheme based on past forecast performance was sufficient to induce a natural 
forecast accuracy incentive that was not part of the formal reward system. This nicely 
complements extant literature on forecast combination that often lacks the organizational 
context by exploring the organizational and psychological factors that shape a forecaster’s 
behavior (Fildes, Goodwin, Lawrence, & Nikolopoulos, 2009). The recently proposed 
salience-assessment-weighting (SAW) model (Rosenzweig & Critcher, 2014) similarly 
emphasizes the importance of weighting dimensions when individuals make forecasts. In 
the collaborative forecasting process described in this study, though, people had a vested 
interest in the outcome and the distortion of forecasts was motivated by departmental 
incentives. Thus, the new forecasting methodology applied previously agreed upon 
decision rules and impartially weighted the departmental forecasts, thus helped sidestep 
the influence of biases and improved forecast accuracy. 
Second, by drawing on agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), we develop a novel 
theoretical construct called “forecast ownership” which we define as the planning and 
control over the forecasting process and its outcomes. While this assigned form of 
ownership may not necessarily be located in the Marketing or Supply Chain Department as 
in our case, shifting this formal responsibility from one group to another may produce 
similar effects as observed at BevCo. In line with agency theory, we assume that 
stakeholders in the forecasting process – in other words, forecast owners and non-owners – 
act according to their incentives and aim at maximizing individual benefits. However, we 
depart from the traditional view of agency theory by showing that assigning formal 
ownership is not the only way to encourage commitment from owners, and more 
importantly non-owners, and aligns diverging interests and motivates forecasting behavior 
that benefits the overall organization. 
So far, most research on psychological ownership has focused on the organization 
or particular jobs as targets of ownership (e.g. Mayhew, Ashkanasy, Bramble, & Gardner, 
2007). We suggest that feelings of ownership may also emerge with respect to a forecast 
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and that the Marketing and Sales Departments, who did not possess formal ownership, 
exhibited a form of psychological ownership. The new methodology to combine 
departmental forecasts gave people the opportunity to exercise control over decisions that 
impacted the forecast, created knowledge about the forecast and a feeling of being 
associated with the forecast. Consequently, also the Sales and Marketing Departments, 
formally non-owners, invested themselves into the forecast and devoted significant energy 
to the process because they experienced the forecast to be theirs. As such, our study 
highlights the need to understand both formal as well as psychological ownership and how 
they affect behavior in cross-functional planning processes. 
Psychological research suggests that ownership not only manifests itself as a legal 
phenomenon, but “operates from both a formal and a psychologically experienced 
platform” (Pierce, Rubenfeld, & Morgan, 1991, p. 126). The concept of psychological 
ownership is defined as a “state in which individuals feel as though the target of ownership 
(material or immaterial in nature) or a piece of it is ‘theirs’” (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 
2001, p. 299). Accordingly, psychological ownership nurtures the feelings of efficacy and 
effectance, helps people to define themselves, and satisfies the need for territoriality and 
security (Pierce et al., 2001). Psychological ownership emerges, if people experience 
having control over the target of ownership, intimately know the target of ownership, and 
invest themselves into the target of ownership (Pierce et al., 2001). Unlike earlier research, 
recent studies propose that feelings of ownership can arise in the absence of formal 
ownership (e.g. Brown, Pierce, & Crossley, 2014). 
 
2.7.2 Managerial implications 
One question that keeps managers in organizations awake at night is the question of 
which department should own the forecast (Smith & Clarke, 2011). Although the present 
study is one of the first to illuminate the concept of forecast ownership based on a real-life 
case study, it does not attempt to answer this particular question. Instead, it addresses the 
broader problems associated with forecasting in organizations on how to achieve accurate 
demand forecasts and shows that forecast ownership, in fact, is a double edged sword with 
both positive and negative consequences, if the social context that surrounds the 
forecasting process is ignored. 
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Assigning formal forecast ownership to a particular department means assigning 
formal responsibility and accountability for the forecast and the results of the forecasting 
process. In many organizations, there is a lack of such clear ownership and the 
responsibilities are diffused across the organization (Adebanjo & Mann, 2000), but even if 
there is a clear owner, all relevant stakeholders in the process have varying interests and 
incentives that may be at odds with the organizational goal of producing accurate 
forecasts. This study shows that assigning forecast ownership to the department that 
assumingly has the highest vested interest in producing accurate forecasts (in our case the 
Supply Chain Department) may improve forecast accuracy in the short-term. However, it 
cannot eliminate the systematic forecast biases to over- or under-forecast that are inherent 
in functional differentiation. Even worse, shifting forecast ownership for the sake of 
forecast accuracy can create unforeseen additional tension between those that possess 
formal ownership and those that have lost it, and jeopardize the entire planning process in 
the long run. This highlights the need for tackling dysfunctional behavior rather than 
focusing on forecast accuracy alone. 
A more holistic approach in this study proved to be the introduction of a new 
forecasting methodology to mechanically combine departmental forecasts into one 
composite forecast using weights based on past forecast accuracy. Such an approach that 
underscores the importance of forecasts can naturally motivate all departments 
(independent of their departmental goals) to forecast accurately (McCarthy Byrne, Moon, 
& Mentzer, 2011). As a result, dysfunctional, biased forecasting behavior can be 
eliminated, forecasts become more accurate and forecast variability decreases leading to 
better predictability of the forecasts and a more stable and robust forecasting process. As 
such this approach offers a viable alternative in situations in which changing formal 
incentive systems is not a feasible solution. Similarly, it is important for managers to 
understand that involvement and commitment from non-owning stakeholders in the 
forecasting process can be achieved through creating a feeling of ownership that goes 
beyond formally assigned ownership. Giving people the opportunity to have a say in the 
forecast, to invest time and energy in the forecasting process, and disseminating 
information and knowledge about the forecast and the forecasting process are all means to 
create such psychological ownership over the forecast. Finally, as the problems of owner 
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and non-owner and misaligned incentives are not exclusive to supply chain planning 
processes our findings generalize to other cross-functional processes in organizations in 
which goal-conflicts are detrimental to performance. 
 
2.7.3 Limitations and future research 
Despite its theoretical and practical contributions the most obvious limitation of the 
present study is that the observations are based on a single case study, and that their 
statistical generalization can therefore be questioned. True as this may be, the general 
strength of case studies is to build theory. Just as others have done for various topics in the 
operations research domain (e.g., Barratt & Barratt, 2011; Bendoly & Cotteleer, 2008; 
Heikkilä, 2002), we were nevertheless able to offer valuable insights for directing future 
research into the role of forecast ownership. As such, the research site represents an 
example of a supply chain planning process that is common place in companies in the 
FMCG industry. Hence, our results have the potential to be informative about people’s 
forecasting behavior in a wider range of similar settings (Yin, 2009). 
As the collaborative forecasting process is increasingly common in many 
organizations and poses similar challenges of aligning all the stakeholders in the process, 
our case study findings can be considered representative. However, more case-based 
research should further develop and refine the concept of forecast ownership and elaborate 
on the dynamics between owners and non-owners when forecast ownership changes. 
Future studies should also consider collecting data from companies in which the ownership 
structure differs from the presented case, if the purpose is to improve generalizability. For 
example, the forecast may be owned by neither Marketing nor Supply Chain, but another 
functional group such as Finance or a neutral entity (Oliva & Watson, 2011), which could 
change the observed behavior and social context. 
When access to real organizations is difficult to gain, forecast tournaments with 
students or managers may offer a good alternative to test theoretical propositions (Tetlock, 
Mellers, Rohrbaugh, & Chen, 2014). Moreover, such competitions have the potential to 
help answer research questions that could otherwise not be answered, for example when 
certain factors should be altered to explore their effect on forecasting behavior. As this 
study shows, the social context and more specifically the social dilemma that surrounds the 
29_Erim BW Protzner-Stand.job
44 
 
forecasting process may have a huge impact on people’s behavior. An avenue for future 
research would be to (artificially) design the social context around the forecasting process 
by altering departmental goals, ownership structures or forecasting methodologies. Vast 
research on social dilemma shows that people generally differ in their sensitivities toward 
cooperation or conflict in such mixed motive situations (e.g., Parks, Joireman, & Van 
Lange, 2013). Hence, investigating inter-individual differences in forecasting tasks 
warrants further research. 
Albeit a retrospective case, the quasi-longitudinal design of our case study allowed 
us to observe the phenomenon and the effect of the change initiatives over time. As this 
was a first attempt to investigate how forecast ownership and forecast combination affect 
forecast behavior in a supply chain planning process, the main contribution of this study 
lies in its level of detail, generating rich data, and suggesting propositions that warrant 
further investigation. 
Conclusion. Summing up, our study shows that assigning forecast ownership to a 
department that is aware of the importance of accurate forecasts is not sufficient to change 
biased forecasting behavior that is rooted in incentive misalignment. A methodology to 
combine forecasts that increases transparency and accountability and creates a sense of 
ownership also among non-owners in the forecasting process can align interests in the 
presence of diverging incentives. 
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Appendix A: Example interview protocol 
1. Information about the CBU 
1.1. Product 
1.2. Customers 
1.3. Suppliers 
1.4. Organizational structure (especially department structure, parties involved in 
forecasting) 
1.5. The division in the  in tpicture” 
1.6. The business environment back then 
2. Personal background 
2.1. How long had you been with BevCo? 
2.2. In what position? 
2.3. What were your main responsibilities? 
3. The forecasting process 
3.1. Describe the process that was initially in place. (each activity and step it 
entailed) 
3.1.1. Involved people, departments in the forecasting process 
3.1.2. Time horizon 
3.1.3. Forecast cycle time 
3.1.4. Times generated and updated 
3.1.5. Tools 
3.1.6. Inputs and outputs 
3.1.7. Meetings 
3.1.8. Performance measures used for the forecast and for the involved parties 
3.2. How would you describe the relationship between the three parties in the old 
process? 
3.3. How effective was the process? Performance? 
3.4. What were major issues with the process? (examples) 
3.5. How did those issues affect performance? (examples) 
3.6. Recall disruptions and how you dealt with them. 
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3.7. Were there previous attempts to solve these issues/work around these issues? 
4. The change process 
4.1. The business environment at the time of the change 
4.2. What was your position at the time the change took place? 
4.3. What was your role in the change process? 
4.4. How did you approach the change/implementation process? 
4.5. Who was involved? 
4.6. Who was affected? 
5. The new forecasting process 
5.1. Describe the new forecasting process. (for every change, new activity, new step, 
enquire about the rationale behind it) 
5.1.1. Involved people, departments in the forecasting process 
5.1.2. Time horizon 
5.1.3. Forecast cycle time 
5.1.4. Times generated and updated 
5.1.5. Tools 
5.1.6. Inputs and outputs 
5.1.7. Meetings 
5.1.8. Performance measures used for the forecast and for the involved parties 
5.2. Name THE one or two key changes. 
5.3. How did the new process address some of the issues of the initial process? 
5.4. How did it affect Marketing? 
5.5. How did it affect Sales? 
5.6. How did it affect Operations? 
5.7. How would you describe the relationship between the three parties in the new 
process? 
5.8. How effective was the new forecasting process? 
5.9. Recall disruptions and how you dealt with them 
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3 The Generation of Negotiated Demand Forecasts: Effects of 
Managerial Role, Social Value Orientation and Agent Type 
The lack of integration of sales and operations is an important shortcoming in judgmental 
forecasts, potentially undermining their accuracy. Using insights from research on 
negotiation and social dilemmas, we posit that departmental affiliation within a company 
shapes a forecaster’s perception about forecast negotiations. Experimental results 
confirmed our prediction that forecasting behavior is moderated by a forecaster’s social 
value orientation – an individual disposition towards cooperation or conflict. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The generation of demand forecasts is an important process in most organizations. 
As forecasts are used for numerous supply chain planning decisions, their accuracy 
directly impacts capacity, inventory levels, customer service levels, and the overall match 
between supply and demand, and consequently a company’s short- and long-term 
profitability (Hendricks & Singhal, 2009). Although a wide variety of quantitative 
forecasting methods are available to facilitate forecast generation, human judgment is still 
an indispensable decision aid in practice (Fildes, Goodwin, Lawrence, & Nikolopoulos, 
2009). However, the value of human judgment in adjusting forecasts depends on the 
credibility of that judgment. Forecasts are often overly optimistic across various industries 
(Cohen, Ho, Ren, & Terwiesch, 2003; Lee, Padmanabhan, & Whang, 2004). Moreover, 
forecasting processes usually cross functional boundaries within companies and include 
different departments, such as marketing, sales, production and operations (Lawrence, 
O'Connor, & Edmundson, 2000). Different perspectives, dispersed knowledge, as well as 
diverging interests and incentives that determine organizational behavior, may also shape 
forecasting behavior such that different departments set the forecast in line with these 
incentives. This makes the task of inter-departmental forecast negotiations highly 
challenging. 
Interestingly, vast behavioral research on negotiation and social dilemmas shows 
that people in general differ in their subjective perceptions of so-called negotiated outcome 
interdependence (Halevy & Katz, 2013) and in their individual sensitivities towards 
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cooperation and conflict (Parks, Joireman, & Van Lange, 2013) that influence how people 
resolve the conflict inherent in social dilemmas. Social value orientation (SVO), as an 
individual difference in how people evaluate outcomes for themselves and others (Messick 
& McClintock, 1968; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994), has received a great deal of attention. 
The vast experimental SVO research shows that prosocial individuals are more likely than 
proself individuals to cooperate in a variety of social dilemmas (for reviews,  see Au & 
Kwong, 2004; Balliet, 2010; De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Van Lange, De Cremer, 
Van Dijk, & Van Vugt, 2007). The present research applies these insights to negotiated 
demand forecasts, and focuses on the extent to which departmental affiliation within a 
company influences forecast and negotiation behavior in forecast meetings. In addition, we 
explore the related issue, if and to what extent the sometimes detrimental effect of 
departmental affiliation on forecast accuracy can be attenuated by a forecaster’s individual 
disposition towards cooperation and conflict. A major contribution of this research is that 
we study the relationships between a forecaster’s departmental affiliation and social 
motives in an experimentally designed social dilemma in the forecasting context. Our 
focus on the relationship between departmental affiliation, social motives and forecasting 
behavior significantly extends our theoretical understanding of forecasting behavior in 
interdependent situations.  
We proceed in Section 2 by providing the theoretical background as well as 
research hypotheses underlying this research. We then describe the experimental design 
and procedure in Section 3, followed by the results in Section 4. Finally, we summarize 
our findings and conclude this article with suggestions for future research opportunities in 
Section 5. 
 
3.2 Theoretical background 
Despite the existence of sophisticated decision support systems, it is common 
practice in companies to adjust statistical forecasts based on human judgment (Fildes et al., 
2009). Among others, adjustments may simply be made to incorporate additional 
information that was not built into the time-series history (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007). This 
is unfortunate, because human judgment can be erroneous due to cognitive limitations 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) as a result of which statistical forecasts may become biased 
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after judgmental modification. Several recent studies have reported behavioral anomalies 
related to demand forecasting and examined ways to improve decision-making in this 
context (e.g. Kremer, Moritz, & Siemsen, 2011; Lee & Siemsen, 2013). In their classic 
behavioral study of the newsvendor problem, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) suggested 
that separating the forecasting and inventory setting task can improve decision-making. 
Similarly, Lee and Siemsen (2013) showed that de-biasing strategies improve forecast 
performance when the task was decomposed into point forecasts, uncertainty judgment and 
service level decisions. This seems to suggest that it is important to examine the different 
components of a decision, in our case forecasting demand and setting the production 
quantity, separately. 
A central challenge in forecasting is to pool the decentralized knowledge about 
demand and supply that exists throughout the company and is often biased by human 
judgment (Kremer, Siemsen, & Thomas, 2012). In organizational forecasting, each 
member represents a different department subject to potentially diverging incentives and 
motivations. Such differentiation generates conflicts over differing expectations, 
preferences, and priorities with respect to how the matching of demand and supply should 
be accomplished (Shapiro, 1977). Importantly, an emerging research in operations 
management now indicates that the forecasting process is especially influenced by a 
forecaster’s departmental role and managerial pressure (Syntetos, Nikolopoulos, Boylan, 
Fildes, & Goodwin, 2009). In their case study, Oliva and Watson (2011) describe a 
consensus forecasting process that includes various departments and that illustrates that 
functional biases can indeed have a major impact on forecast performance. Kuo and Liang 
(2004) have shown that departmental roles indeed influence forecasts, even if different 
departments possess the exact same information. Another study examining the effect of 
departmental roles on forecasting showed that differential departmental roles, that is, being 
part of a Marketing or Production Department, distorted (i.e., biased) judgmental forecasts 
in line with organizational incentive structures (Önkal, Lawrence, & Zeynep Sayim, 2011). 
It therefore makes sense to assume that when forecasts are connected to functional targets, 
forecast accuracy may suffer as a result of biased forecast behavior. A production 
manager, aiming at keeping inventory levels low, may provide lower forecasts, while a 
product manager concerned with sufficient product availability, may set forecasts high to 
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avoid lost sales. Thus, being a member of a specific (organizational) department may have 
an impact on someone’s actual forecasts and the planned production quantity that is 
communicated to another department. We thus predict the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Managerial role impacts forecasting behavior such that sales 
managers will be overoptimistic in their forecast and inflate the communicated 
production quantity whereas operations managers will be cautious in their forecasts 
and deflate the communicated production quantity. 
 
In order to solve the problem of forecast manipulations in inter-organizational 
settings, repeated interaction (Ren, Cohen, Ho, & Terwiesch, 2010) or contract design (e.g. 
Cachon & Lariviere, 2001; Özer & Wei, 2006) have been suggested to align incentives. 
From a more behavioral perspective, differential goals and interdependences affect an 
individual’s motivations and decisions in operations management settings in general 
(Bendoly, Croson, Goncalves, & Schultz, 2010) and in the forecasting context in particular 
(Özer, Zheng, & Kay-Yut Chen, 2011). 
Within social dilemma research, social value orientation is an important personality 
measure that in general refers to the weight people attach to their own outcomes relative to 
those of others in an interdependency situation (Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange 
& Kuhlman, 1994). As an individual difference measure, SVO captures the extent to 
which people deal with conflict in a social dilemma, and opt for choices that are in their 
own or rather than collective interest. A variety of social motives can be distinguished 
(Murphy & Ackermann, 2014), but the individualistic (non-cooperative) and the prosocial 
(cooperative) orientations are especially relevant in negotiations. In fact, social motives 
have been shown to have a major impact in a negotiator’s strategy (De Dreu et al., 2000; 
Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).When people are low on SVO, thus individualistic, non-
cooperative, they attach importance to maximizing their own outcome; when people are 
high on SVO, thus prosocial, cooperative, they are concerned with achieving high 
outcomes for themselves and other interdependent people (Murphy, Ackermann, & 
Handgraaf, 2011; Nauta, Dreu, & Vaart, 2002; Parks et al., 2013). Overall, previous 
research has shown that prosocial individuals exhibit more cooperation than proself 
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individuals (Beersma & De Dreu, 2002; De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001; De Dreu & van 
Lange, 1995) 
Of particular relevance to the present discussion is the research by Nauta et al. 
(2002) on problem solving behavior of manufacturing, planning and sales employees 
during interdepartmental negotiations. This research suggests that people high on SVO in 
organizational settings are inclined to also consider the goals of other departments in their 
decision-making. For example, manufacturing employees would not only be concerned 
with efficiency as their primary goal, but also care about service which is a particular 
concern of a Sales Department. On the other hand, people low on SVO are inclined to 
ignore the consequences of their decisions on another department. For example, sales 
employees may exclusively focus on customer service and ignore the impact that certain 
sales decisions may have on operational efficiency, which is a primary goal for the 
Manufacturing and Planning Departments. Interestingly, SVO also makes a difference for 
adopted negotiation strategy in inter-departmental negotiations, and the extent to which 
there is a match or mismatch between how to approach the social dilemma (see Halevy & 
Katz, 2013, for a more abstracted observation; Rhoades & Carnevale, 1999). Applied to 
negotiated forecasts, it therefore makes sense to assume that – taking the organizational 
role into account – a decision maker’s own motivational orientation, that is, whether she is 
high or low on SVO, will affect forecasting behavior in such a way that sales and 
operations managers low on SVO are particularly concerned with their own departmental 
goals and therefore make forecast and production decisions to ensure that departmental 
goals are reached. We thus predict the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Managerial role and SVO interact such that forecasts of sales and 
operations managers will be more biased and production quantities more inflated 
(versus deflated) when a decision-maker’s SVO is low rather than high, 
respectively. 
 
Major components of organizational forecasting are the aggregation of individual 
forecasts into one number, and the negotiation process during which forecasts are adjusted 
in order to reach a consensus forecasts. Negotiation, though, involves a fundamental 
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tension between a need to cooperate or to compete in order to achieve their goals – that is, 
negotiation is a typical social dilemma situation, in which outcomes result from 
interdependencies between parties (De Dreu, 2010; Parks et al., 2013). This begs into 
question what induces participants to change their initial position and thus de-bias 
forecasts and improve forecast accuracy. The behavioral research into social dilemmas 
deviates from the economic alternative (cf. Ostrom, 1998) in the sense that the extent to 
which someone is prone to cooperate or compete with someone else depends on that 
person’s willingness or motivation to do so. In a cooperative approach, one would usually 
seek win-win solutions and aim at maximizing common outcomes. In a competitive 
approach, one would usually pursue one’s personal goals (Parks et al., 2013). Similarly, 
research on the reciprocity of cooperation or conflict has shown that cooperative and 
competitive individuals differ in their expectation about the cooperative motives of their 
negotiation partner (Lumsden, Miles, Richardson, Smith, & Macrae, 2012; Parks & 
Rumble, 2001; Van Lange, 1992; Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007). Applied to 
the forecasting process, an accurate forecast represents a common goal, while functional 
incentives such as minimizing lost sales or obsolescence costs represent individual goals. 
People react differently in negotiations depending on the perceived competitiveness or 
cooperativeness of their counterpart (Burnham, McCabe, & Smith, 2000). However, 
because perceptions of outcome interdependence are a function of someone’s affiliation 
(as in general shown by: Halevy & Katz, 2013), we predict that also in forecast 
negotiations, people show the tendency to over- or under-forecast (and subsequently 
inflate or deflate) their forecasts more extremely depending on their managerial role, social 
value orientation and cooperativeness of the negotiation counterpart. We thus predict the 
following: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Managerial role and negotiation strategy interact such that forecasts 
will be less biased in a cooperative forecast negotiation, but more biased in a 
competitive forecast negotiation. 
 
Figure 3.1 graphically presents the model for the present study. The hypotheses 
were put to the test in a laboratory experiment, which gave us full control over our 
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experimental conditions and the experimental task, and allowed us to measure participant’s 
forecasting behavior with a relatively high degree of objectivity. 
 
Figure 3.1: Proposed model experiment 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (managerial role: 
sales, operations) X 2 (agent type: cooperative, competitive) mixed factorial design to 
which SVO was added as covariate. The initial sample consisted of 111 participants (55 
men, 56 women, M age = 23.09 years, SD = 6.23). The majority (97 participants) was from 
a Dutch university who received course credits for participation in a laboratory 
experiment. The remaining 14 participants were professionals who completed the 
experiment as part of an in-house company training. There were no differences between 
the two sub-groups in terms of SVO or forecasting behavior, hence we treated them as one 
group in further analyses. The data of a small fraction of participants (N = 7; 6.31%) were 
excluded from analyses. Six participants were excluded because they answered both 
manipulation check questions regarding their role in the experiment incorrectly, indicating 
that they misunderstood the role assigned to them, which was also shown in their random 
answers to the experimental task. One participant was excluded from the analysis because 
of an unusual SVO categorization which seemed to suggest a striking lack of interest in the 
assignment. This resulted in a final sample of 104 participants, i.e. 90 undergraduate 
students and 14 professionals (53 men, 51 women, M age = 23.20 years, SD = 6.37). 
Managerial 
role 
Forecasting 
behavior 
SVO 
Cooperation/ 
competition 
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Materials and Procedure 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants received instructions for the 
experimental task containing the role manipulations, together with background information 
about the company, a producer of fresh juice for which they presumably worked as a 
demand planner. Participants were instructed to forecast demand for the product for the 
coming month (one month equaled one period), and to provide an input, i.e. a production 
quantity, to a planning meeting with another demand planner in each period. The 
forecasting task was thus separate from the participation in the planning meeting. 
The experimental task consisted of two separate phases in which the participant 
was provided with 18 periods of historic demand data as shown in Figure 3.2. The demand 
distribution was a random walk with noise and our demand environment resembled a non-
stationary (high change, high noise) demand pattern. This is common in research on 
forecasting as it captures many real-life situations as opposed to stationary demand 
patterns that do not reflect real life processes very well (Gardner, 2006; Makridakis & 
Hibon, 2000). 
 
Figure 3.2: Historic demand data for phase 1 and 2 
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In the first phase, participants were asked to provide per period: (1) a private 
forecast estimate of expected demand that only they could see, and (2) a separate 
production quantity, which was used as input for the planning meeting, and shared with the 
other demand planner. At the end of each period, participants could see the consensus 
forecast of the planning meeting, which was the average of their own and the other 
demand planner’s production quantity, and determined the final production quantity.  In 
each period, the participant could observe actual demand after decision making and 
reception of feedback about forecast accuracy, lost sales, obsolete units, company profit 
and individual performance score. For phase two, participants were informed about a 
change in the company’s policy regarding forecast generation – a three-round negotiation 
process would be introduced into the planning meeting. Now, after submitting their 
production quantity, participants could also see the other demand planner’s production 
quantity and decide whether or not to adjust their own input. Upon completion, 
participants were directed to an online post-questionnaire including manipulation checks 
and SVO. Participants were debriefed at the end of the experiment. 
Manipulation of managerial role. Participants received instructions that either 
described their role as sales or operations manager, and aimed at triggering the adoption of 
role-specific behavior as follows: 
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(1) You are an operations manager. Your job is about getting work done quickly, 
efficiently, without error, and at low cost. Minimizing costs is a key responsibility 
of this position. Unsold juices are obsolete at the end of a period, as they are no 
longer fresh. A high level of obsoletes means that you will have to destroy 
products that you produced and for which you employed resources. As a result 
you will have incurred obsolescence costs, namely 1€ production cost for every 
unsold bottle of orange/mango juice. Keep that in mind when providing input for 
the planning meeting! 
(2) You are a sales manager. Maximizing customer service levels and increasing 
sales are key responsibilities of this position. Sales involves meeting the sales 
targets of the organization through developing sales plans that identify the sales 
possibilities and future market conditions. Sales are, of course, a launch pad for 
profit. If there are not enough products available, Sunrise incurs cost of lost sales 
and profits are foregone. Lost sales cost you 1€ for every bottle of unfulfilled 
demand. Keep that in mind when providing input for the planning meeting! 
Participants were evaluated based on how well they achieved the goals of their 
particular function – i.e., minimized lost sales for the sales manager and minimizing 
obsolete products for the operations manager. These incentives were chosen based on the 
distinct costs each function incurs from a mismatch between demand and supply (Fisher, 
1997).  
Manipulation of agent type. Depending on managerial role, the other demand 
planner in the planning meeting, in reality a programmed computer agent, possessed the 
opposite role – i.e., participants with a sales manager role encountered an operations 
manager in the meeting and participants with an operations manager role encountered a 
sales manager in the meeting. 
Phase 1. In the first phase, the agent type was held constant for all participants in 
terms of its forecasting behavior. This means that for each agent type – sales or operations 
– there was a predetermined sequence of production quantities that the agent followed.  
Phase 2. In the second (negotiation) phase, the computer agent was programmed to 
respond more or less cooperatively as indicated by the level of concessions. A cooperative 
agent was more willing to move closer towards the optimal point of the participant in 
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terms of forecast accuracy than a competitive agent who stayed closer to its own optimal 
point. Participants were informed of the managerial role of the other demand planner, but 
not of the demand planner’s negotiation strategy. 
The planning meeting was simulated as an electronic negotiation in which 
negotiation partners did not meet face-to-face. Electronic negotiations in general do not 
suffer from efficiency loss in terms of integrative agreements compared to face-to-face 
negotiations (Croson, 1999). In fact, the level of cooperation, for example mutual 
disclosure, trust and reciprocity, is higher in face-to-face negotiations compared to 
negotiations through mediated channels (McGinn & Croson, 2004). Also in our setup, 
electronic negotiation with the agent did not automatically lead negotiators to behave 
cooperatively: our electronic negotiation context was characterized by low social 
awareness to control for the confounding effect of high levels of social awareness that tend 
to increase prosocial (cooperative) motives in negotiations (De Dreu et al., 2000). 
Social value orientation. The SVO slider measure (Murphy et al., 2011) was used 
to assess participants’ social value orientation. The SVO slider measure has been 
demonstrated to yield high internal consistency, test-retest reliability and construct validity 
(Murphy et al., 2011), to outperform other SVO measures such as the 9-Item Triple-
Dominance Measure or the Ring Measure on this metrics, and to overcome some 
limitations of previous SVO measures (Murphy & Ackermann, 2011). The measure was 
introduced to the respondent as a resource allocation task in which the decision-maker has 
to indicate her preference how a joint payoff should be distributed between her and another 
unknown person; see Table 3.1 for two example items. 
 
Table 3.1: Two example items of the SVO slider measure 
 Option 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Item 1 
Self 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 
Other 85 76 68 59 50 41 33 24 15 
Item 2 
Self 85 87 89 91 93 94 96 98 100 
Other 15 19 24 28 33 37 41 46 50 
(source: Murphy et al., 2011) 
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Participants were asked to indicate their preferred option to allocate the gain 
between oneself and another. Based on six primary items in the slider measure, 
participants were described as high or low scorers on SVO. These categories were derived 
from a computed SVO angle. First, the mean of the payoff allocations for self (ഥୗ) as well 
as for the other (ഥ୓) were calculated. Then, 50 was deducted from both means (R. O. 
Murphy et al., 2011). In order to arrive at a single index of an individual’s social value 
orientation, the inverse tangent of the means was computed: 
ܸܱܵι ൌ ܽݎܿݐܽ݊ ሺܣҧை െ ͷͲሻ ሺܣҧௌ െ ͷͲሻΤ         (1) 
The idealized SVO types can be derived from the boundaries between the angles – 
i.e. altruists would have an angle greater than 57.15°, prosocials would have angles 
between 22.45° and 57.15°, individualists would have angles between –12.04° and 22.45° 
and competitive types would have an angle less than –12.04° (Murphy et al., 2011). For 
the analyses reported in the present study, we used the continuous SVO. 
 
Dependent measures  
Forecasts. We recorded participants’ forecasts for each period and phase. In order 
to compare groups, we averaged an individual’s forecasts for each phase, where for phase 
1, FC1 denotes the average forecast of round 1 to 10 and for phase 2, FC2 denotes the 
average forecast of round 11 to 20.  
 Production quantities. We recorded participants’ production quantities Q for each 
period and phase. As participants entered only one production quantity as meeting input in 
phase 1, we proceeded with calculating the average production quantity Q1 for phase 1 as 
described above. For phase 2, we averaged an individual’s initial production quantities 
(Q2.1) that were entered at the beginning of the negotiation and the final production 
quantities that were entered at the end of the negotiation (Q2.4). 
Adjustment score. We also calculated an adjustment score for each period and 
phase that indicated to what extent participants inflated or deflated their private forecasts 
to the communicated production quantity. For sales, an adjustment score of 1 indicated an 
inflated production quantity. For operations, an adjustment score of -1 indicated a deflated 
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production quantity. An adjustment score of zero would indicate no difference between 
forecast and communicated production quantity.  
Concession score. Finally, for the negotiation phase, we recorded concession 
behavior from the first to the final negotiation cycle in each period, indicating whether 
participants moved towards or away from their negotiation counterpart, the computer 
agent. For sales, a concession score of 1 indicated concessions in the direction of 
operations – i.e., moving towards operations’ optimal point. For operations, a concession 
score of -1 indicated concessions in the direction of sales – i.e., moving towards sales’ 
optimal point. 
 
3.4 Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Our manipulation of managerial roles was intended to affect participant’s 
forecasting behavior following particular functional incentives. To check whether our 
manipulation had been successful, we asked participants two questions about their 
assigned role in the forecasting meeting.  The two items were: “What was your specific 
role in the forecasting meeting?” and “According to the instructions, which manager were 
you?” In the sales condition, 94.8 percent of participants answered both role-related 
questions correctly, while in the operations condition, 95.7 percent of participants 
answered those questions correctly. A t-test revealed significant differences for the 
manipulation check for sales (M = 1.03, SD = 0.11) and operations (M = 1.98, SD = 0.10), 
t(102) = -44.67, p < .01. 
Our manipulation of agent type was intended to affect participants’ perception of 
the cooperativeness of their negotiation counterpart. To check whether participants indeed 
perceived the agent’s negotiation behavior as such, we asked participants to what extent 
they had perceived their counterpart in the negotiation as cooperative, on a five-point 
rating scale ranging from 1 (not at all), to 5 (very much so).  A t-test revealed that 
participants in the cooperative agent condition perceived the agent as more cooperative (M 
= 3.79, SD = 0.94) than participants in the competitive agent conditions (M = 3.37, SD = 
0.89), t(102) = 2.37, p < .05. This indicated that both manipulations indeed triggered 
managerial role and agent type, respectively. 
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To test our three hypotheses, we used conditional process analysis (Hayes, 2013). 
All hypotheses were tested with the inclusion of bootstrap estimates and 95% confidence 
intervals, and with the inclusion of the control variables age, gender and forecasting 
experience. None of these control variables had a significant effect on the outcome 
measures, and thus could be disregarded in further analyses. An overview of correlations 
between the independent and dependent variables is provided in Table 3.2.   
Managerial role (dummy-coded, sales = -1, operations = 1) was not significantly 
related to forecasts or production quantities, but the negative direction of the relationship is 
as expected. Agent type (dummy-coded, cooperative = -1, competitive = 1) was negatively 
related to SVO. SVO was negatively related to the forecast in phase 1, indicating that a 
higher (prosocial) SVO is related to lower forecasts. Forecasts and production quantities 
were positively correlated across both phases. 
 
Table 3.2: Descriptives and correlations 
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Managerial 
role 
-.12 1.00 -       
2 Agent type .00 1.00 -.08 -      
3 SVO 23.36 12.67 .04 -.22* -     
4 Forecast 1 527.30 152.53 .03 .12 -.20* -    
5 Forecast 2 615.62 222.92 -.11 -.12 -.11 .34** -   
6 Production 
quantity 1 
487.89 140.78 .10 .06 -.04 .49** .48** -  
7 Production 
quantity 2.1 
599.70 231.92 -.13 -.09 -.01 .20* .91** .62** - 
8 Production 
quantity 2.4 
612.40 225.88 -.03 -.06 .02 .26** .80** .66** .92** 
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01, two-tailed. 
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Forecasting behavior. In the first phase, we did not find the predicted main effect 
of managerial role on forecast, β = -44.75, t(100) = -.71, ns., and communicated production 
quantities, β = 53.02, t(100) = .90, ns. Participants in the sales and operations role 
condition on average did not differ in their forecasting behavior. Analyses also did not 
reveal the predicted interaction effect of managerial role and SVO on forecasts, β = 2.43, 
t(100) = 1.04, ns. or production quantities, β = -1.07, t(100) = -.48, ns. We did, however, 
find a significant main effect of SVO on forecasts, β = -2.39, t(100) = -2.03, p < .05, 95% 
CI = [-4.72; -0.06], which showed that participants high on SVO gave lower forecasts than 
participants low on SVO.  
In the second phase, managerial role significantly affected the forecasts, β = -
255.41, t(96) = -2.71, p < .01, 95% CI = [-442.51, -68.31] and production quantities 
(Q2.1), β = -200.13, t(96) = -2.01, p < .05, 95% CI = [-398.25, -2.01]. As predicted, 
participants in the operations role condition on average gave lower forecasts and 
communicated lower production quantities than those in the sales condition. Analyses also 
revealed the expected interaction effect of managerial role and SVO on forecasts, β = 8.87, 
t(96) = 2.53, p < .05, 95% CI = [1.92, 15.81] as shown in Figure 3.3. In line with 
expectations, participants low on SVO enacted their managerial role in a more biased way 
than those high on SVO. We found a trend towards the same pattern for communicated 
initial production quantities, β = 6.02, t(96) = 1.63, p = .11, 95% CI = [-1.33, 13.38]. Thus, 
while Hypotheses 1 and 2 had to be formally rejected for the first phase, they were 
confirmed for the second phase. 
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Figure 3.3: Average forecasts for managerial roles depending on SVO 
 
 
Negotiation behavior. Hypothesis 3 predicted that forecasting behavior during the 
negotiation phase would depend on the joint interaction of managerial role, agent type and 
SVO. We did not find this overall three-way interaction effect on forecasts, β = -9.29, t(96) 
= -1.33, ns., or production quantities, β = -8.72, t(96) = -1.18, ns. But analysis of the 
decomposed interaction terms made clear that the conditional effect of the managerial 
role–SVO interaction on forecasts existed for cooperative agents, β = 13.51, t(96) = 2.51, p 
< .05., 95% CI = [2.82, 24.20], but not for competitive agents, β = 4.22, t(96) = .95, ns. 
Participants in the sales role and low on SVO entered higher forecasts when playing 
against a cooperative agent than when playing against a competitive agent, see Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4: Demand forecast under different agent types in the negotiation 
 
 
 
Albeit only marginal, the conditional effect of the role–SVO interaction on 
production quantities also existed for cooperative agents, β = 10.38, t(96) = 1.82, p = .72., 
95% CI = [0.9363, 21.6977], but not for competitive agents, β = 1.66, t(96) = .35, ns. 
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Again, participants in the sales role and low on SVO entered higher production quantities 
when playing against a cooperative agent than when playing against a competitive agent, 
see Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5: Production quantities under different agent types in the negotiation 
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Our predictions thus hold true for participants in the sales role condition especially 
in the face of a cooperative, but not a competitive, agent.  
Forecast adjustment and concessions. To further our understanding of the 
forecasting and negotiation behavior of participants, we ran additional analyses at the level 
of forecast adjustment and concessions. A comparison between participants in the sales 
condition (M = -1.12; SD = 4.43) and participants in the operations condition (M = -0.96; 
SD = 4.88) in the first phase revealed no significant differences between the groups, t(102) 
= -.18, ns. However, in the negotiation phase, participants in the sales condition inflated 
their private forecasts (M = 1.16; SD = 5.80), whereas participants in the operations 
condition deflated their private forecasts (M = -1.43; SD = 5.08) when communicating the 
production quantity, t(102) = 2.4, p < .05. This is in line with their functional incentives. 
We also found a significant effect of managerial role in the negotiation phase on 
concession scores indicating that participants in the sales condition conceded downwards 
(M = 2.50; SD = 5.74), whereas participants in the operations condition conceded upwards 
(M = -5.98; SD = 4.73), t(102) = 8.26, p < .01. 
 
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The lack of integration of sales and operations is an important shortcoming in 
judgmental forecasts, potentially undermining their accuracy. Using insights from research 
on negotiation (De Dreu & van Lange, 1995; De Dreu, 2010; Parks et al., 2013) and social 
dilemmas (Dawes & Messick, 2000; Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013), we 
predicted that departmental affiliation within a company shapes a forecaster’s perception 
about forecast negotiations. Results showed that departmental affiliation indeed influenced 
forecasting behavior in such a way that people with an operations role on average gave 
lower forecasts than those with a sales role. Furthermore, results made clear that this effect 
was moderated by people’s social value orientation (SVO). First, forecasts were more 
extreme, in line with functional incentives when people were low (versus high) on SVO. 
Second, SVO steered the extent to which people’s forecasting behavior and communicated 
production quantities was influenced by their departmental – most notably sales – 
affiliation, and the way they interacted with a cooperative or competitive negotiation 
counterpart. 
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Scientific relevance. From a scientific perspective, this research follows the call 
for more research of human behavior in operating environments (Bendoly, Donohue, & 
Schultz, 2006; Gino & Pisano, 2008) as it focuses on behavioral factors that influence 
forecast generation in organizations. We aim to make three important contributions. First 
of all, literature on forecasting usually focuses on the suitability and advantages of various 
forecasting techniques (a notable exception is Moritz, Siemsen, & Kremer, 2014). 
Moreover, despite the fact that most forecasting processes in organizations are based on 
interdepartmental cooperation, most behavioral research on forecasting has focused on 
either individual forecasters (Lawrence, Goodwin, O'Connor, & Önkal, 2006) or groups 
with undifferentiated roles (e.g. Ang & O'Connor, 1991). Our results relate to the growing 
literature on the role of managerial frames in forecasting (Kuo & Liang, 2004; Oliva & 
Watson, 2009; Önkal et al., 2011). We indeed demonstrate departmental biases in both the 
forecasts as well as communicated production quantities. 
Second, combining insights from forecasting as well as social psychology 
literature, this study focuses on individual differences to define de-biasing strategies. Such 
de-biasing strategies require an understanding of the underlying psychological processes 
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Katsikopoulos & Gigerenzer, 2013) that lead sales and 
operations manager to over- or under-forecast respectively. By conceptualizing the 
interdepartmental forecasting process as a social dilemma, our study suggests that such 
intentional biases rooted in functional differentiation are less for individuals with a 
prosocial orientation. This is in line with a general stream of negotiation research that has 
shown that prosocial individuals exhibit more cooperation than proself individuals 
(Beersma & De Dreu, 2002; De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001; De Dreu & Van Lange, 
1995). As such our study also offers a new managerial decision-making domain to explore 
motivational solutions to social dilemmas that primarily have been researched within the 
context of experimental games such as the prisoner's dilemma, the public goods dilemma 
or the tragedy of the commons (Balliet, 2010). 
Finally, by taking motivational orientation of decision-makers into account to 
examine how forecast accuracy can be improved, our study of motivation in an operations 
management context also extends the scope of existing research in behavioral operations 
that mainly revolves around identifying decision-making biases in operations (Bendoly et 
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al., 2010). Albeit important heuristics and biases are not the only factors that affect choices 
and decisions, but also motivation or the lack thereof. 
Practical relevance. This study touches upon a real-world forecasting problem, 
and that is the policy making function of forecasts in organizations (Wright & Rowe, 
2011). Forecasts often serve particular purposes, for example, to justify promotion 
campaigns of the Marketing Department. Managerial pressure also often influences 
forecasts (Syntetos et al., 2009). Our study demonstrates – in a laboratory setting that was 
sufficient to motivate such purposive forecasting – that forecasts are rarely neutral and 
should be interpreted with care because forecasters are influenced by their departmental 
roles. It seems as if the departmental role offers a particular frame with which forecasters 
interpret information and make decisions. Furthermore, our results suggest that such 
deliberately biased forecasting behavior in forecast negotiations is not only a result of a 
forecaster’s departmental role, but also one’s individual disposition towards cooperation or 
conflict. From a managerial perspective, it means that it is not enough to understand the 
different goals and incentive structures that exist in organizations, but it is necessary to 
consider individual differences in motivational orientation of people that may impede or 
advance integrated solutions during interdepartmental negotiations.  It is important to 
understand the social motives of members from different departments that need to 
cooperate in an interdepartmental negotiation process to generate forecasts. Especially, if 
organizational structures and processes cannot be modified in such a way that they reduce 
the inherent conflicts of interdepartmental negotiation, managerial interventions should 
aim at selection of employees in such a way that their personalities and behaviors ‘fit’ 
strategically communicated negotiation outcomes, and to establish a match between 
individual as well as common (organizational) interests. In other words, there is a need to 
manage the social value orientations of employees. Our research proposes a way forward. 
Framing interdepartmental forecast negotiations as cooperative, encouraging discussions 
between departments to understand the impact of individual decisions on others as well as 
allowing time for negotiation to converge opinions could all bridge the gap that 
organizational differentiation creates. 
Limitations and future research. The present research raises several questions 
that merit attention and future research. In our study we found that social value orientation 
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is an important factor in judgmental forecasting, the adjustment of forecasts and 
negotiation between Sales and Operations Departments to determine a consensus forecast. 
However, with the present design we were unable to explain why this was the case. 
Interestingly, Nauta, De Dreu and Van der Vaart (2002)  suggested that a high (prosocial) 
value orientation is related to the concern for goals of another department. Another 
possible explanation could be that social value orientation affects the conflict handling and 
negotiation strategy of the interdependent parties. De Dreu and Van Lange (1995)  showed 
that people high on social value orientation cooperate more than people low on social 
value orientation, and gave more concessions during a negotiation. This seems to suggest 
that inclusion of self-, opponent- or observer-rated conflict management strategies (De 
Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer, & Nauta, 2001) may be worth considering. The 
investigation of potential mediators such as departmental goal concern or conflict handling 
style could therefore be a fruitful avenue for future research. Third, in our experiment, we 
measured social value orientation as a dispositional factor, whereas it can also be 
situationally induced (De Dreu et al., 2000). The latter approach would allow us to not 
only manipulate departmental goals, but also social motives so as to mimic the conflict of 
the social dilemma of negotiated forecasts. Finally, it should be noted that our conclusions 
apply to a dyadic situation. We chose to include sales and operations as potentially the 
most contrasting organizational units in the forecasting process in terms of goals, 
incentives and planning horizons. However, in practice, the forecasting process may also 
include other departments such as finance and marketing. Thus, future research could 
incorporate not only more managerial roles, but also switch from human-agent computer 
interaction to face-to-face group discussions in which several issues at varying degrees of 
priority for different departments can be negotiated about. 
Conclusion. Our study advances the work on behavioral forecasting by integrating 
social psychological research with research on forecasting to disentangle the complex 
nature of cooperation in social dilemmas in the context of the forecasting process. Results 
make clear that the departmental affiliation and social value orientation shape a 
forecaster’s perception of forecast negotiations and influence the accuracy of demand 
forecasts. 
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4 Managerial role, organizational incentives and goal concerns in 
interdepartmental forecast negotiations 
Incompatible departmental goals potentially undermine the accuracy of demand forecasts 
in collaborative forecasting processes. Using insights from research on forecast 
collaboration and negotiation, we posit that departmental affiliation within a company 
shapes forecasting behavior in inter-departmental forecast negotiations commonly found 
in companies. Experimental results confirmed our prediction that managerial role and 
incentives jointly affect the concern for particular goals which in turn influence 
forecasting behavior during negotiations. The study suggests that the influence of 
departmental affiliation on forecast accuracy can be explained by self-concern and 
attenuated by organizational incentives. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Matching demand and supply is paramount for many firms because a mismatch is 
costly and affects a company’s short- and long-term profitability (Hendricks & Singhal, 
2009). If demand is underestimated, inventory levels may be too low to fulfill customer 
orders, which could translate into damaged customer relationships and lost sales. If 
demand is overestimated, inventory may build up causing inventory holding costs and 
products possibly become obsolete before they can be sold. In order to align demand and 
supply, coordination between different functional departments within firms is important to 
accurately forecast and fulfill customer demand. In many organizations, forecasting 
processes usually include different departments, such as marketing, sales, production and 
operations (Lawrence, O'Connor, & Edmundson, 2000). However, achieving coordination 
among the different parties is nontrivial due to diverging interests, goals and incentives 
that shape organizational behavior. In an interdepartmental forecasting process, different 
departments may set forecasts in line with their incentives in order to achieve specific 
(departmental) objectives, thereby jeopardizing the accuracy of the forecast. The case 
study by Oliva and Watson (2011) illustrates how functional biases can affect forecasting 
performance. 
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The literature on forecast collaboration within firms has especially focused on ways 
to engage and motivate the sales force (Chen, 2005; Gonik, 1978; Lal & Staelin, 1986; 
McCarthy Byrne, Moon, & Mentzer, 2011), and the marketing-manufacturing interface 
(Celikbas, George Shanthikumar, & Swaminathan, 1999; Li & Atkins, 2002; Porteus & 
Whang, 1991). The literature on forecast sharing between firms has concentrated on 
identifying contract designs to incentivize retailers and manufacturers to share demand 
forecasts and information credibly (Cachon & Lariviere, 2001; Özer & Wei, 2006). In 
practice, organizations use incentive schemes to reduce such dysfunctional forecasting 
behavior by, for example, including forecast accuracy in performance evaluations. 
When departmental goals are incompatible, members of different departments face 
the dilemma of choosing between their own departmental goal and an overall 
organizational goal (Nauta, Dreu, & Vaart, 2002). Applying this insight to the context of 
forecast collaboration within firms, forecasters face the dilemma of serving their own 
departmental goal, for example reaching a certain sales quota or forecasting accurately, as 
accurate forecasts may benefit the overall organization but put the achievement of 
departmental objectives at risk. The well-established dual concern model (Pruitt & 
Carnevale, 1993; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994) distinguishes between a concern for one’s 
own and others’ goals. A key finding of negotiation research is that negotiators are more 
likely to engage in problem solving behavior when they are concerned about their own as 
well as their opposing negotiator’s outcome (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000).  
The present research applies these insights to negotiated demand forecasts and 
focuses on the extent to which departmental affiliation within a company shapes forecast 
and negotiation behavior in forecast meetings. Given the departmental affiliation, we 
explore the related issue whether the extent to which a forecaster produces accurate 
forecasts and shares credible information depends on the type of incentive – that is, a 
departmental incentive to pursue functional goals or a collective incentive to pursue 
forecast accuracy. In addition, we posit that goal concerns affect forecasting and 
negotiation behavior in the collaborative forecasting process. 
We conducted a laboratory study where participants make a private forecast 
decision and communicate a production quantity to a negotiation partner over sequential 
periods after observing historic demand. This allows us to disentangle the influence of 
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managerial role and incentives on forecast and negotiation behavior. Moreover, we explore 
whether managerial roles and incentives jointly explain why people bias their forecast and 
distort their production quantity. An explanation for such behavior, that we examine, is the 
concern for either departmental or collective goals. 
 
4.2 Theoretical background 
The phenomenon of demand forecast distortion has been studied extensively in the 
literature on supply chain information sharing, usually focusing on inter-organizational 
settings with dyads of a retailer and a supplier or manufacturer (e.g. Aviv, 2001; Mishra, 
Raghunathan, & Yue, 2009) who have conflicting interests that impact their forecast 
sharing behaviors. Similarly, in organizational forecasting, each member represents a 
different department subject to potentially diverging incentives and motivations. Such 
differentiation generates conflicts over differing expectations, preferences, and priorities 
with respect to how the matching of demand and supply should be accomplished (Shapiro, 
1977). Importantly, an emerging research in operations management now indicates that the 
forecasting process is influenced by a forecaster’s departmental role (Kuo & Liang, 2004; 
Önkal, Lawrence, & Zeynep Sayim, 2011). In their case study, Oliva and Watson (2011) 
describe a consensus forecasting process that includes various departments and that 
illustrates how functional biases could affect forecasting performance. Another study 
examining the effect of organizational roles on forecasting showed that differential 
organizational roles, that is, being part of a Marketing or Production Department, distorts 
judgmental forecasts in line with organizational incentive structures (Önkal et al., 2011). 
The same conclusion can be drawn from a study by Kuo and Liang (2004) where 
forecasters differed in their judgment even when they receive the same information. 
Within companies, forecasts may be consistently biased, if incentives of different 
organizational departments encourage over- or under-forecasting to reach departmental 
targets (Lawrence et al., 2000). This is especially true when forecasts are connected to 
targets and functional performance. A production manager who aims at keeping inventory 
levels low, may provide lower forecasts, while a product manager who is concerned with 
sufficient product availability, may set forecasts high to avoid lost sales.  
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The literature on supply chain information sharing has examined ways to mitigate 
the problem of forecast manipulations in inter-organizational settings, such as repeated 
interaction (Ren, Cohen, Ho, & Terwiesch, 2010) or contract design to align incentives 
(e.g. Cachon & Lariviere, 2001; Özer & Wei, 2006). Focusing on inter-individual 
differences of decision-makers, Özer, Zheng and Chen (2011) examine the role of trust and 
trustworthiness in fostering credible forecast information sharing, and thereby took a 
behavioral perspective on forecasting. Similarly, differential goals and interdependence 
affect an individual’s motivations and decisions in various operations management settings 
(Bendoly, Croson, Goncalves, & Schultz, 2010). 
Employees in organizations usually aim at the goals of their own department and 
little, if at all, at goals of another department. This has been termed narrow role 
orientation (Parker, Wall, & Jackson, 1997). If the concern for particular goals is indeed 
the main process through which functional differentiation affects behavior in inter-
departmental negotiations (Nauta et al., 2002), it seems sensible to focus on incentives that 
stimulate either the pursuit of individual or collective goals in the forecasting process. In 
fact, incentives as opposed to contracts in inter-organizational settings may positively 
affect forecast accuracy, if they emphasize accuracy as a goal (Önkal et al., 2011). On the 
other hand, if incentives differ, the effect of a forecaster’s departmental role can be 
amplified as a study by Yaniv (2011) showed. In this study, homogenous groups with the 
same incentive did not a reveal a framing effect of different roles, whereas heterogeneous 
groups with differing incentives showed a strong framing effect. 
We expect sales people to be concerned with their departmental goals of selling and 
having sufficient products in stock to minimize lost sales, especially when incentives 
highlight the pursuit of departmental goals rather than collective company-wide goals. 
Operations people are likely to be concerned with their departmental goal of keeping 
inventory levels low to avoid obsolescence costs, if products cannot be sold. On the 
contrary, incentives that highlight the importance of forecast accuracy to improve 
company profits represent a collective goal. While departmental incentives are likely to 
reinforce the concern with particular functional goals, company incentives are likely to 
mitigate the negative effect of functional differentiation on goal concern and may lead 
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people to be more concerned with forecast accuracy instead of departmental goals. We 
thus predict the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Incentives moderate the relationship between managerial role and 
goal concern for lost sales: sales managers are more concerned with minimizing 
lost sales when following departmental incentives instead of company incentives 
than operations managers. 
Hypothesis 1b: Incentives moderate the relationship between managerial role and 
goal concern for obsoletes: operations managers are more concerned with 
minimizing obsoletes when following departmental incentives instead of company 
incentives than sales managers. 
Hypothesis 1c: Incentives moderate the relationship between managerial role and 
goal concern for forecast accuracy: both sales and operations managers are more 
concerned with maximizing forecast accuracy when following company incentives 
instead of departmental incentives. 
 
Although departments determine the monthly forecast mostly independently, the 
task of arriving at a consensus forecast that determines the production quantity is a 
collaborative process. This often involves negotiations and information sharing prior to the 
forecast meeting. Being a member or representative of a specific (organizational) 
department may not only have an impact on someone’s goal concern, but also on 
forecasting behavior and the extent to which information is credibly shared – that is 
whether the communicated forecast prior to the planning meeting is equal to the private 
forecast. Importantly, the concern for one’s own or other goals are “motivating desires to 
reach certain outcomes” (Janssen & Van de Vliert, 1996, p.102) and is not a goal in itself. 
Hence, goal concern for lost sales and goal concern for obsoletes explain why sales and 
operations with a departmental incentive bias their forecasts and distort production 
quantities in line with their objectives. Goal concern for forecast accuracy by contrast 
explains why the same departments with a forecast accuracy incentive try to more 
accurately predict demand and credibly share their production quantity. We expect that 
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organizational roles impact both, the (private) forecasts and the extent to which these 
forecasts are distorted in pre-meeting communications. We thus predict the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Goal concern for lost sales mediates the moderating effect of 
incentives on the relationship of managerial role with forecasts, production 
quantities and forecast inflation. 
Hypothesis 2b: Goal concern for obsoletes mediates the moderating effect of 
incentives on the relationship of managerial role with forecasts, production 
quantities and forecast inflation. 
Hypothesis 2c: Goal concern for forecast accuracy mediates the moderating effect 
of incentives on the relationship of managerial role with forecasts, production 
quantities and forecast inflation. 
 
Figure 4.1 graphically presents the model for this study. In sum, we propose that 
incentives moderate the role–forecasting behavior relationship and that this moderating 
effect is mediated by the goal concern for lost sales, goal concern for obsoletes and goal 
concern for forecast accuracy. The hypotheses were put to the test in a laboratory 
experiment, which gave us full control over our experimental conditions and the 
experimental task, and allowed us to measure participant’s forecasting behavior with a 
relatively high degree of objectivity. 
 
Figure 4.1: Proposed model experiment 2 
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4.3 Method 
In this study, we build on and adapt the experimental design that we used in an 
earlier study on behavioral forecasting (Protzner, Pennings, Rook, & Van Dalen, 2015). 
While the first study explored the effect of managerial role and social value orientation in 
negotiated demand forecasts, we use an explicit differential incentive scheme in this study 
to explore whether the effect of managerial roles on forecasting behavior is reinforced or 
mitigated by incentives. Organizational incentives can either emphasize cooperative versus 
competitive goals and may elicit cooperation or competition among different departments 
in the forecasting process. Moreover, we explore whether managerial roles and incentives 
jointly lead people to be concerned with different goals which in turn affect forecasting 
behavior and possibly forecast manipulations. 
 
Participants and Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (managerial role: 
sales, operations) X 2 (incentive: department, company) factorial design. The sample 
consisted of 245 participants (147 men, 98 women, M age = 22.49 years, SD = 5.61). The 
majority (210 participants) was from a Dutch university who received course credits for 
participation. The remaining 35 participants were professionals from a Dutch company. 
The experiment was conducted at the behavioral laboratory of the university. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants completed a training phase in 
which they could familiarize themselves with the forecasting task. After the training phase, 
participants received instructions for the experimental task containing the role 
manipulations, together with background information about the company, a producer of 
fresh juice for which they presumably worked as a demand planner. Participants were 
instructed to forecast demand for the product for the coming month (one month equaled 
one period) and provide input (i.e. a production quantity) to a planning meeting with 
another demand planner in each period. The experimental task consisted of two separate 
phases in which the participant was provided with 18 periods of historic demand data. We 
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used the same demand series as in our first behavioral forecasting study (Protzner et al., 
2015). 
In the first phase, participants had to provide: (1) a private, not shared forecast of 
the demand, and (2) a separate production quantity in each period. The latter was used as 
an input for the planning meeting, and shared with the other demand planner. After each 
period, participants could see the outcome of the planning meeting – i.e. the production 
quantity calculated as the average of their own and the other demand planner’s input. This 
average determined the final production quantity. The participant could also observe actual 
demand after decision making and reception of feedback about forecast accuracy, lost 
sales, obsolete units, company profit and individual performance score. After the first 
phase, participants were informed about a change in the company’s policy regarding 
forecast generation – a three-round negotiation process would be introduced into the 
planning meeting. After submitting their production quantity, participants could see the 
other demand planner’s production quantity and decide whether or not to adjust their own 
input. 
The interdepartmental forecast negotiations were conducted electronically, and 
participants played against a pre-programmed computer agent. Participants with a sales 
manager role encountered an operations manager in the meeting and participants with an 
operations manager role encountered a sales manager in the meeting. Upon completion, 
participants were directed to an online post-questionnaire including manipulation checks. 
Participants were debriefed at the end of the experiment. 
Manipulation of managerial role. Participants received instructions that described 
their role as either sales or operations manager as follows: 
(1) You are an operations manager. Your job is about getting work done quickly, 
efficiently, without error, and at low cost. Minimizing costs is a key 
responsibility of this position. Unsold juices are obsolete at the end of a period, 
as they are no longer fresh. A high level of obsoletes means that you will have 
to destroy products that you produced and for which you employed resources. 
As a result you will have incurred obsolescence costs, namely 1€ production 
cost for every unsold bottle of orange/mango juice. Keep that in mind when 
providing input for the planning meeting! 
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(2) You are a sales manager. Maximizing customer service levels and increasing 
sales are key responsibilities of this position. Sales involves meeting the sales 
targets of the organization through developing sales plans that identify the 
sales possibilities and future market conditions. Sales are, of course, a launch 
pad for profit. If there are not enough products available, Sunrise incurs cost of 
lost sales and profits are foregone. Lost sales cost you 1€ for every bottle of 
unfulfilled demand. Keep that in mind when providing input for the planning 
meeting! 
Manipulation of incentive. Participants received instructions that described their 
incentive either as a departmental or company incentive, and aimed at triggering the 
adoption of goal-driven behavior. The departmental incentives were chosen based on the 
distinct costs each function incurs from a mismatch between demand and supply (Fisher, 
1997). The respective instructions for the operations and sales manager in the departmental 
incentive condition were as follows: 
(1) As in most companies, your performance as an operations manager is 
evaluated based on how well you achieve the goals of your operations 
function. That means minimizing the number of obsolete products and the 
associated obsolescence costs every month. 
(2) As in most companies, your performance as a sales manager is evaluated based 
on how well you achieve the goals of your sales function. That means 
minimizing the number of lost sales and the associated costs of lost sales every 
month. 
Instructions for the operations and sales manager in the company incentive 
condition only differed in the ascribed role: 
(3) Sunrise is naturally keen to forecast as accurately as possible in order to reduce 
the potential costs. To achieve that goal, the performance of every manager is 
evaluated based on how accurate demand is forecasted. Your performance as 
an operations manager/sales manager is evaluated based on the accuracy of the 
consensus forecast every month. Forecast accuracy is measured as the mean 
absolute percentage error (Mape). This error percentage should be as low as 
possible. 
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Dependent measures 
Goal concerns. To measure goal concern, we used the item developed by Nauta et 
al. (2002) but adapted the goals to fit the forecasting context (minimizing lost sales, 
minimizing obsolete units, maximizing forecast accuracy). Participants were asked the 
following question: “For each of the goals, can you indicate the degree to which you 
actually aimed at it during the experiment? This may be, for example, because the goal is 
part of your job, because you are rewarded for achieving it, or because you believe the 
goal to be important for another reason.” 
Forecasts. We recorded participants’ forecasts for each period and phase, including 
the training phase. In order to compare groups, we averaged an individual’s forecasts for 
each phase, where for phase 1 FC1 denotes the average forecast of round 1 to 10 and for 
phase 2, FC2 denotes the average forecast of round 11 to 20.  
Production quantities. We recorded participants’ production quantities Q for each 
period and phase. As participants entered only one production quantity as meeting input in 
phase 1, we proceeded with calculating the participant’s average production quantity Q1 
for phase 1 as described above. For phase 2, we averaged an individual’s initial production 
quantities (Q2.1) that were entered at the beginning of the negotiation. Similarly, we also 
averaged the final production quantities that were entered at the end of the negotiation 
(Q2.4). 
Forecast inflation. For each period and phase, we recorded the deviation between 
the private forecast and the communicated production quantity that indicated to what 
extent participants inflated or deflated their private forecasts. A score of zero would 
indicate that both numbers are the same. A positive (versus negative) value would indicate 
forecast inflation (versus deflation) as the production quantity in this case would be higher 
(versus lower) than the forecast. 
Concessions. Finally, for the negotiation phase, we recorded concession behavior 
from the first to the final negotiation cycle in each period, indicating whether participants 
moved towards or away from their negotiation counterpart (i.e., the agent). This was 
calculated as the absolute deviation between the initial and final production quantity. 
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4.4 Results 
Manipulation checks 
Our manipulation of managerial roles was intended to affect participant’s 
forecasting behavior. To check whether our manipulation had been successful, we asked 
participants about their role in the forecasting committee. The two items were: “What was 
your specific role in the forecasting meeting?” and “According to the instructions, which 
manager were you?” A t-test revealed significant differences in role understanding for 
sales (M = 1.08) and operations (M = 1.93), t(243) = -25.49, p < .001. Hence, participants 
in the sales condition understood their role as sales managers whereas participants in the 
operations condition understood their role as operations managers. Our manipulation of 
incentive was intended to make participants follow a departmental or company-wide goal. 
To check whether participants had understood their incentive, we asked participants how 
their performance in the experiment was evaluated. A t-test revealed significant differences 
in incentive understanding for departmental incentive (M = 1.40) and company incentive 
(M = 1.79), t(243) = -6.71, p < .001. This indicated that both manipulations indeed 
triggered managerial role and incentives, respectively. 
 
Training phase 
In the training phase, there were no significant differences in participants’ forecasts, 
F(1, 244) =  .004, ns., and performance as indicated by the mean average percentage error 
(Mape), F(1, 244) = 1.25, ns. between the four experimental conditions. This was expected 
as the role and incentive manipulations were only administered after the training phase. 
Thus, without specific role and incentive instructions participants forecasted and 
performed equally. 
 
Hypotheses test results 
An overview of the means, standard deviations and correlations among the study 
variables is provided in Table 4.1. Managerial role (dummy-coded, sales = -1, operations = 
1) was not related to forecast, production quantity or forecast inflation in phase 1 while it 
was negatively related to production quantity and forecast inflation as well as the deviation 
between initial and final production quantity in phase 2. Managerial role was also 
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negatively related to goal concern for lost sales and positively related to goal concern for 
obsoletes. Incentive type (dummy-coded, departmental = -1, company-wide = 1) was 
positively related to goal concern for forecast accuracy. Goal concern for lost sales was 
positively related to production quantity in phase 1 and to forecast, production quantity 
and forecast inflation in phase 2. Goal concern for obsoletes was negatively associated 
with production quantity in phase 1 and 2, and with forecast inflation in phase 2. Goal 
concern for forecast accuracy was positively related to production quantity and forecast 
inflation in phase 2. 
The descriptive statistics resulting from the experimental conditions are given in 
Table 4.2. As can be seen, participants across all four conditions on average do not differ 
in their training forecasts. While the participants in the company incentive condition 
continue to give almost the same forecast and production quantities independent of their 
sales or operations role, participants in the department condition on average differ in their 
forecast and production quantities, especially in phase 2. 
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To test our hypotheses, we performed separate hierarchical regression analyses. In 
each regression, we entered the control variables gender, cohort, experience, and age in the 
first step. Managerial role and incentive type were entered as independent variables in step 
2. In step 3, the interaction between managerial role and incentive type were also entered 
as predictors. Finally, goal concern for lost sales, goal concern for obsoletes, and goal 
concern for forecast accuracy were entered as mediators in step 4. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 
summarize the results for phase 1 and phase 2, respectively. 
Main effects of managerial role and incentive type. In both phases, the results of 
the regression analysis indicate that managerial role explains a significant amount of 
variance in goal concern for lost sales (ȟܴଶ = .09, F(6,238) = 4.89, p < .01) and goal 
concern for obsoletes (ȟܴଶ = .08, F(6,238) = 4.51, p < .01), exceeding the variance 
explained by the controls. Managerial role significantly predicted the extent to which 
participants were concerned with minimizing lost sales (β = -.31, p < .01) and minimizing 
obsoletes (β = .28, p < .01): participants with a sales role were more concerned with 
minimizing lost sales (M = 3.72, SD = 1.12) than participants with an operations role (M = 
2.96, SD = 1.27) while participants with an operations role were more concerned with 
minimizing obsoletes (M = 3.77, SD = 1.14) than participants with a sales role (M = 3.09, 
SD = 1.19). Incentive type explained 14 percent of the variance in goal concern for 
forecast accuracy, significantly exceeding the variance explained by the controls (Δܴଶ = 
.12, F(6,238) = 6.18, p < .01). Incentive type significantly predicted the extent to which 
participants were concerned with maximizing forecast accuracy (β = .35, p < .01): 
participants with a company incentive were more concerned with maximizing forecast 
accuracy (M = 4.59, SD = .68) than participants with a departmental incentive (M = 3.94, 
SD = 1.11). 
Managerial role significantly predicted forecast inflation in phase 1 (β = -.13, p < 
.05) and phase 2 (β = -.19, p < .01) such that, for example for phase 2, participants with an 
operations role deflated their private forecasts (M = -15.18, SD = 85.31) while participants 
with a sales role inflated their forecasts (M = 14.80, SD = 68.89). In phase 2, managerial 
role also significantly predicted production quantity (β = -.18, p < .05) to such an extent 
that participants with an operations role gave lower production quantities (M = 573.10, SD 
= 103.23) than participants with a sales role (M = 606.61, SD = 83.13). 
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Interaction of managerial role and incentive type. The interaction of managerial 
role and incentive type only explained a significant amount of variance in goal concern for 
obsoletes, exceeding the variance explained by the control variables and the main effects 
(Δܴଶ = .02, p < .05). There was no interaction of managerial role and incentive type for 
goal concern for lost sales (β = .10, p = .11) or goal concern for forecast accuracy (β = .02, 
p = .79) as posited in Hypotheses 1a and 1c. Simple slope tests (Aiken & West, 1991) 
showed that participants with an operations role had a higher concern for minimizing 
obsoletes when having a departmental incentive (β = .49, t = 4.69, p < .01) rather than a 
company incentive (β = .18, t = 1.68, p < .1). This result, illustrated in Figure 4.2, lends 
support to Hypothesis 1b. 
 
Figure 4.2: Incentive as a moderator of the relationship between role and goal 
concern obsoletes 
 
 
In phase 2, the interaction of managerial role and incentive type explained a 
significant amount of variance in production quantity (Δܴଶ = .02, p < .05) and (albeit only 
marginally) forecast inflation (Δܴଶ = .02, p < .1), exceeding the variance explained by the 
control variables and the main effects. Simple slope tests (Aiken & West, 1991) showed 
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3.42, p < .05) when having a departmental incentive rather than a company incentive (β = -
4.03, t = -0.47, n.s.). They also deflated their private forecast more when having a 
departmental incentive (β = -24.39, t = -3.50, p < .01) rather than a company incentive (β = 
-5.38, t = -0.77, n.s.). Participants with a sales role gave higher production quantities when 
having a departmental incentive rather than a company incentive, but this difference was 
not significant. They also generally inflated their forecast independent of the incentive 
type. This result is illustrated in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.3: Incentive as a moderator of the relationship between role and production 
quantity 
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Figure 4.4: Incentive as a moderator of the relationship between role and forecast 
inflation 
 
Test of mediated moderation. Our next goal was to test whether goal concern for 
lost sales, goal concern for obsoletes and goal concern for forecast accuracy mediated the 
moderating effect of incentive type. Mediated moderation occurs when two predictor 
variables, in our case managerial role and incentive type, interactively affect one or as in 
this study multiple mediators, which in turn affect an outcome variable (Morgan-Lopez & 
MacKinnon, 2006). Tables 3a and 3b (model 2, step 3) show that the interaction of 
managerial role and incentive type was significant in contributing to the mediator goal 
concern for obsoletes, but not goal concern for lost sales or forecast accuracy. Moreover, 
goal concern for obsoletes but also goal concern for lost sales, were significant in 
contributing to forecast, production quantity and forecast inflation in phase 2; see Table 
3b, model 4, 5 and 6, step 4. The proposed mediator goal concern for forecast accuracy 
significantly contributed to production quantity and forecast inflation; see Table 3b, model 
5 and 6, step 4. With regard to production quantity and forecast inflation, controlling for 
the mediators reduced the (marginally) significant regression coefficients of the role-
incentive interaction to non-significant levels. 
To estimate and test the significance of the conditional indirect effect, we followed 
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managerial role and incentive type to the dependent variables forecast, production quantity 
and forecast inflation via the mediators goal concern for lost sales, goal concern for 
obsoletes and goal concern for forecast accuracy do not significantly differ from zero. 
Separate analyses for forecast, production quantity and forecast inflation supported 
the significance of the indirect effect of the managerial role-incentive interaction through 
goal concern for obsoletes on forecast in phase 2 (95% CI = .2939 to 9.3637) and 
production quantity in phase 1 (95% CI = .3340 to 18.9024) and phase 2 (95% CI = .8303 
to 25.5149). These findings illustrate that the interactive effect of managerial role and 
incentive on forecasting behavior is a function of the goal concern for obsoletes, but not of 
goal concern for lost sales or forecast accuracy. Thus, Hypotheses 2b was supported 
whereas we could not find support for Hypotheses 2a and 2c. 
 
4.5 Discussion 
Incompatible departmental goals potentially undermine the accuracy of demand 
forecasts in collaborative forecasting processes. Using insights from research on forecast 
collaboration and negotiation (Nauta et al., 2002), we predicted that managerial role and 
incentive type jointly affect forecasting and negotiation behavior because people are 
concerned with diverging functional goals. Our results show that managerial role and 
incentive type indeed influenced the concern for particular goals in such a way that sales 
managers were on average more concerned with lost sales whereas operations managers 
were more concerned with obsoletes, especially when following a departmental incentive. 
Following a company-wide incentive led people to be more concerned with forecast 
accuracy than any of the more functional goals. Results also made clear that production 
quantities and forecast distortion were more extreme, that is, in line with their functional 
role descriptions when people had a departmental incentive rather than a company-wide 
incentive. Goal concern for obsoletes mediated this moderating effect of incentive type on 
the managerial role–forecast behavior relationship. 
Theoretical implications. From a scientific perspective, this research focuses on 
explaining the causes of human biases that affect performance in an operations 
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management context (Bendoly, Donohue, & Schultz, 2006; Gino & Pisano, 2008), as it 
focuses on motivational factors that influence forecast generation in organizations. We aim 
to make two important contributions. Although forecasting processes in organizations 
usually rely on inter-departmental coordination, most behavioral research on forecasting 
has focused on either individual forecasters (Lawrence, Goodwin, O'Connor, & Önkal, 
2006), or groups with undifferentiated roles (e.g. Ang & O'Connor, 1991). Our results are 
in line with previous studies examining the effect of managerial roles on forecast behavior 
in organizations (Kuo & Liang, 2004; Oliva & Watson, 2009; Önkal et al., 2011). We 
indeed find departmental biases in forecasts and production quantities. However, the 
present study extends this line of research and takes a social psychological approach to 
examine how forecast accuracy can be improved by taking into account how departmental 
affiliation and goals influence people in their decision-making. Our findings make clear 
that departmental affiliation exerts its influence on forecast behavior in interdepartmental 
forecast negotiations through particular functional goal concerns. 
Second, combining insights from forecasting as well as social psychology literature, 
this study extends the scope of the research in behavioral operations management 
examining motivations and goal structures to define de-biasing strategies instead of 
identifying gaps between normative models and actual decision-making behavior in 
operations contexts. In order to devise de-biasing strategies, we need to understand the 
underlying psychological processes that cause these biases (Katsikopoulos & Gigerenzer, 
2013) which, in our case, lead sales and operations managers to over- or under-forecast 
respectively. Second, a study of motivation in a forecasting task extends the existing work 
in behavioral operations that often revolves around heuristics and biases and how they 
affect choices and decisions (Bendoly et al., 2010). 
Practical relevance. From a managerial perspective, this study highlights a real-
world forecasting problem, that is forecasts in organizations are often used as an 
instrument to achieve certain outcomes (Wright & Rowe, 2011). Forecasts are also 
influenced by managerial pressure (Syntetos, Nikolopoulos, Boylan, Fildes, & Goodwin, 
2009). Our laboratory setting was sufficient to motivate exactly such purposive forecast 
behavior and highlights the need to interpret forecasts with care as they are rarely neutral 
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but influenced by departmental roles. These roles provide a framing effect when 
forecasters interpret information and make decisions. Furthermore, our results suggest that 
such deliberate forecast distortion is not only a result of a forecaster’s departmental role, 
but also the type of incentive that a forecaster is having. Different goals and incentive 
structures motivate people in organizations and may impede integrated solutions in inter-
departmental forecast negotiations. A tactic to advance accurate forecasting would be to 
increase the concern for the opposing department’s goal. Organizational structures and 
processes may affect forecast accuracy directly by creating incentives conducive to 
collaboration or indirectly through fostering goals and motives which in turn affect 
forecasting and negotiation behavior. In other words, there is a need to manage the 
motivations of employees so as to bridge the gap that organizational differentiation creates. 
Limitations and future research. The present research raises several questions 
that merit attention and future research. In our study we found that incentive type and goal 
concern are important factors in forecast collaboration between the sales and operations 
departments. We could also show that (departmental versus company) incentives influence 
the (individual versus. collective) goals that people are concerned with. Interestingly, 
Nauta et al. (2002) suggested that a prosocial value orientation is related to the concern for 
goals of another department. While we examined incentives as a means to increase the 
concern for forecast accuracy, the investigation of the join effect of incentives and social 
value orientation could be a fruitful avenue for future research. It is reasonable to assume 
that prosocial individuals have a high concern for their own as well as the other 
department’s goals even if they have a departmental incentive whereas people with an 
individualist value orientation will only have a high concern for their own, but not the 
other department’s goal under such circumstances. 
It should be noted that our conclusions only apply to dyads in a negotiation context. 
We chose to include sales and operations as two organizational units in the forecasting 
process that potentially have the most diverging goals, incentives and planning horizons. 
However, in practice, the forecasting process may also include members from other 
departments, for example finance and marketing. Future research could not only extend the 
number of managerial roles, but also employ face-to-face group discussions instead of 
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computer-based human-agent interaction. In that case the negotiation can also revolve 
around departmental issues and priorities (as opposed to the forecast number only) that are 
relevant for ultimately understanding the motivations that affect forecasting behavior. 
Conclusion. Our study advances the work on behavioral forecasting by integrating 
social psychological research with research on forecasting to disentangle the complex 
nature of cooperation in social dilemmas in the context of the forecasting process. We 
identified incentive type as an important organizational factor that broadens our 
understanding of when departmental affiliation shape a forecaster’s perception of forecast 
negotiations and influence the concern for particular goals that in turn impact the accuracy 
of demand forecasts. 
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5 The perception of real versus illusionary trends in time-series 
forecasting 
A central challenge of forecasting from time-series is to distinguish random variation from 
persistent patterns in the data. Previous research has shown that such judgmental 
forecasts are subject to a number of systematic errors. A well-documented example is 
forecasters’ tendency to damp trends. We examine the influence of different noise, change 
and trend levels on forecasters’ perception of trends in time-series data. Results from a 
controlled laboratory experiment show that forecasters detect real trends even when 
random noise is high as long as persistent change in the level of the time-series is low. 
Forecasters incorporate illusionary trends into their forecast when time-series are very 
noisy. Furthermore, the extent to which forecasters damp trends does not only depend on 
the noise in the time-series, but also the persistent changes in the level. Finally, we identify 
another type of forecast behavior: the tendency to reverse real trends and trend-like 
patterns. This allows us to show that the way trends are perceived is more complex than 
previously thought. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Forecasting in organizations remains an inherently judgmental task. Surveys over 
the last 10 years have consistently shown that only about 25 percent of companies rely on 
statistical methods exclusively, with the remaining companies allowing some element of 
human judgment to influence their forecasts (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007; Fildes & 
Petropoulos, 2015). Reasons for such reliance on human judgment have little to do with 
the availability of software. Rather, such reasons are often constructive in nature and relate 
to incomplete forecasting models not containing important leading indicators of demand 
such as scheduled promotions or predicted severe weather events (Fildes, Goodwin, 
Lawrence, & Nikolopoulos, 2009). Some reasons can be less constructive, as decision 
makers feel the need to influence the forecast to alter the resulting decisions, or they 
simply do not trust the statistical forecast since the underlying complex algorithm appears 
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to them as a black-box and causes skepticism (Goodwin, 2002). In either case, the 
forecasting process in organizations is inherently influenced by human judgement, and 
thus understanding how human judgement forms in the context of time-series is important 
for understanding and improving forecasting processes in organizations. 
This paper examines how forecasters perceive trends in time-series data. If no real 
trends are present in a dataset, forecasters can nevertheless spot trends in the inherently 
random data – a tendency that has been termed as illusionary trend detection (Kremer, 
Moritz, & Siemsen, 2011). We examine such illusionary trend detection and establish how 
prevalent it is depending on the degree to which time-series are inherently stable. If real 
trends are present in the data, the commonly held view is that forecasters will detect such 
trends, but they will dampen these trends as they extrapolate into the future since the most 
recent demand acts as an anchor point (Bolger & Harvey, 1993). We also examine such 
trend dampening behavior, and show that in the dynamic forecasting task we present, trend 
dampening is only one form of how forecasters react to a trend in a time-series; other 
forms of behavior include what we term trend reversals, which is possibly a consequence 
of the gambler’s fallacy, i.e. the belief that particular high values average out with 
particular low values. 
We thus study human perceptions of trends in a time-series and present results from 
a behavioral experiment that systematically varies three characteristics of the demand 
environment: noise, level change and trend change. Our results are descriptive, in that we 
do not present a model or hypotheses of how human decision makers will respond to 
alternative time-series. Yet these results not only firmly document the prevalence of 
illusionary trend detection, but also show that the way trends are perceived in the data is 
more complex than previously established. The paper proceeds as follows. The next 
section discusses relevant literature that relates to our research. We then describe the 
experimental design and procedure in Section 3, followed by the results in Section 4. 
Finally, we summarize our findings and conclude this article with suggestions for future 
research opportunities in Section 5. 
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5.2 Theoretical background 
Most of the existing research on judgmental time-series forecasting has focused on 
pattern detection. According to Eggleton (1982) forecasters assess the underlying process 
that has generated the time-series and acquire a cognitive representation of that process in 
order to extrapolate from past information and make an unbiased forecast. However, 
people may not actually use this internal representation for forecasting (Harvey, 1988). If 
people observe variations in demand, they need to separate systematic variation (trends 
and seasonality) from random noise. Noise poses a particular problem for forecasters to 
identify the underlying data-generating process. Sanders (1992) provides evidence that 
performance of judgmental forecasts deteriorates with increasing noise levels. While 
forecasts should reflect actual patterns but not the random noise in the data, people take 
into account both when making their forecasts (Harvey, 1995). Psychological research 
suggests that people have a poor conception of randomness (Ayton, Hunt, & Wright, 1989; 
Falk & Konold, 1997) and read signals into random changes in time-series (O'Connor, 
Remus, & Griggs, 1993). 
In order to reduce the complexity, people often use heuristics when making 
judgments under uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Harvey (2007) provides an 
overview of forecasting research that shows that people use similar heuristics when 
making predictions. For example, forecasters employ anchoring and adjustment heuristics 
when making forecasts from time-series (e.g. Eggleton, 1982). This introduces biases into 
the forecast because people do not sufficiently adjust away from the last data point of the 
series that serves as an anchor. This is particularly problematic, if the time-series includes 
trends. In such situations, forecasters have the tendency to under-extrapolate trends which 
leads to the phenomenon of trend damping (Bolger & Harvey, 1993; Harvey & Bolger, 
1996; Lawrence & Makridakis, 1989). People damp trends in time-series data such that 
forecasts lie above downward slopes and below upward slopes (Lawrence & Makridakis, 
1989). Bolger and Harvey (1993) showed that, if people were required to make more than 
the one-step-ahead forecast, i.e. up to six-step ahead forecasts, people used their own 
previous forecast as an anchor instead of the last observation from the data series and did 
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not adjust for the trend component. Finally, the study by O’Connor et al. (1997) showed 
that the direction of a time-series including trends and trend changes can make a difference 
to how accurately people forecast. Forecasts for flat and upward sloping series were better 
than those for downward sloping series. Furthermore, greater trend damping occurred for 
downward sloping series, which can possibly be explained by participants’ expectations to 
reverse downward trends, but not upward trends. 
Besides the heuristics explanation, adaptation may explain trend damping. Reimers 
and Harvey (2011) explored the extent to which people are sensitive to autocorrelation in 
time-series and to what extent biases and contextual variables affect judgment. Results 
from three experiments showed that people perceive the degree of autocorrelation in time-
series data, but they also seemed to perceive positive autocorrelation in uncorrelated time-
series. The study shows that people’s judgment is affected by the knowledge about natural 
time-series such as population growth, which initially tend to accelerate, but eventually the 
growth becomes damped. Further support for this ecological explanation of trend damping 
comes from Harvey and Reimers (2013) who report results from three experiments that 
demonstrate that trend damping cannot be attributed to under-adjustment. Instead the 
authors suggest an alternative explanation that people come across trends in their natural 
environment, which do not persist over time. People take this experience of damped trends 
in their natural environments into account when making forecasts. 
In contrast to most research on trend damping that tries to explain the occurrence of 
this effect, our research focuses on the specification of forecast patterns. In addition to 
trend-damping, one other forecast pattern has already been identified by Harvey and 
Reimers (2013) who showed that people exhibit anti-damping (forecasts that are more 
extreme than the upward or downward sloping trend lines), especially for decelerating 
functions and for linear series with shallow slopes. This calls into question whether more 
patterns may actually exist. Some evidence for additional patterns also comes from the 
research on regime change that has shown that people tend to predict that trends will 
reverse in the future, if they observed such reversals in the past even if they were told that 
the time-series follows a random walk (Bloomfield & Hales, 2002). However, this regime 
shifting behavior does not seem to be universal. Asparouhova, Hertzel and Lemmon 
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(2009) found that the length of a streak impacts the likelihood with which participants 
predict future reversals. For short streaks, people were more likely to predict reversals 
whereas for long streaks people were more likely to predict continuation. Although this 
research is informative, it applies to binary outcomes and time-series that actually do not 
contain systematic variations. It appears that the perception of trends seems to depend on 
variations in the change and noise level of a time-series (Kremer et al., 2011). Thus, the 
central question of our research is under what conditions do people detect actual trends and 
inadequately react to illusionary trends. 
 
5.3 Method 
In this study, we build on and extend the experimental design that Kremer et al. 
(2011) used in an earlier study on behavioral forecasting. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of six experimental conditions representing different demand environments 
characterized by the three systematically varying parameters change c, noise n and trend r. 
The latter is an extension of the original Kremer et al. (2011) design that included the 
change and noise components, but no trend component. 
Demand environment. As in Kremer et al. (2011), forecasts are made in each 
period t after observing demand ܦ௧ . No additional information on future demand is 
provided apart from the information contained in the time-series ܦ௧ ൌ  ሼܦ௧ǡ ܦ௧ିଵǡ ܦ௧ିଶǡ ǥ ሽ. 
The demand process follows: 
ܦ௧ ൌ ߤ௧ ൅ ߝ௧      (1a) 
ߤ௧ ൌ ߤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߬௧ିଵ ൅ ߭௧     (1b) 
߬௧ ൌ  ߬௧ିଵ ൅ߣ௧,      (1c) 
where ߝ௧̱ሺͲǡ ݊ଶሻ, ߭௧̱ሺͲǡ ܿଶሻ and ߣ௧̱ሺͲǡ ݎଶሻ are independent random 
variables. Thus, the time-series contains three types of components: temporary shocks 
(through ߝ௧– termed noise throughout) and permanent shocks (through ߭௧ and ߣ௧ – termed 
change and trend throughout, respectively). The standard deviation c captures the change 
in the true, unobserved level ߤ௧ and the standard deviation r captures the trend in the level, 
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that is, permanent shocks of the time-series that persist in subsequent periods. The standard 
deviation n captures the noise surrounding the level, that is, temporary shocks to the time-
series that last for a single period. Figure 5.1 provides example datasets with different 
values of n, c and r to illustrate the parameter’s influence on the shape of the time-series. 
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Figure 5.1: Example demand times-series for different n, c, and r 
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Optimal forecast. The optimal forecast ܨ௧ାଵכ  (made in period t for the following 
period t + 1) for a time-series without trend follows the single exponential smoothing 
method (Muth, 1960), 
ܨ௧ାଵ ൌ ܨ௧ ൅ ߙሺܦ௧ െ ܨ௧ሻ,     (2) 
where the previous forecast ܨ௧ is adjusted towards the most recent demand 
observation ܦ௧ , and the magnitude of the adjustment depends on the forecast error 
ܧ௧ ൌ ܦ௧ െ ܨ௧ and the weight α, that is placed on that error. The forecast will be more 
strongly revised, the larger the forecast error. The weight depends on the underlying 
parameters of the demand environment, that is, the change (c) and noise (n) parameters, 
which define the change-to-noise ratio W = c2 / n2. If variations in demand result mainly 
from noise (low values of W), forecast errors should not influence the forecast. If 
variations in demand represent actual changes in the level of the series (high values of W), 
forecast errors should be taken into account for the new forecast (for an elaboration of that 
intuition, see Harrison, 1967). The optimal smoothing parameter ߙכ and can be formalized 
as: 
ߙכ ൌ ଶ
ଵାඥଵାସௐషభ
      (3) 
Combining the optimal forecasting method in Equation (2) with the optimal 
parameter in Equation (3) yields the optimal forecast strategy for our non-trend demand 
environment, 
ܨ௧ାଵ ൌ ܨ௧ ൅ ߙכሺܹሻሺܦ௧ െ ܨ௧ሻ.     (4) 
For trend-time-series, the optimal forecast follows a two-step approach using the 
double exponential smoothing. First, the current level ܮ௧ is estimated comparable to 
Equation (4) by,  
ܮ௧ ൌ ܨ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙሺܦ௧ െ ܨ௧ିଵሻ.     (5) 
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Second, the current trend ௧ܶ is estimated using  
௧ܶ ൌ ௧ܶିଵ ൅ ߚሺܮ௧ െ ܮ௧ିଵ െ ௧ܶିଵሻ.     (6) 
Combining the two estimates, the forecast for the upcoming period is  
ܨ௧ǡ௧ା௡ ൌ ܮ௧ ൅ ݊ ௧ܶ      (7) 
Following Harrison (1967), the optimal smoothing parameters ߙכǡ ߚכ can be found 
solving 
ߚଶ ଵܹ ൌ ͳ െ ߙ       (8) 
ߚଶ ଶܹ ൌ ߙଶ ൅ ߙߚ െ ʹߚǡ      (9) 
where ଵܹ ൌ ݊ଶȀݎଶ and ଶܹ ൌ ܿଶȀݎଶǤ  
 
Experimental design. In line with the setup of the experiment in Kremer et al. 
(2011), participants were required to make sequential forecasts based on consecutive time-
series demand signals which were generated from a random walk with noise. Participants 
were provided with 30 periods of demand history and were asked to make a forecast for 
one, two and three periods ahead in each of 25 successive periods. Throughout the 
experiment, participants were also provided with a graph that displayed demand up the 
current period and updated automatically. Additionally, a table included past demand, 
previous forecasts, and absolute forecast errors. 
We varied the degree of change by setting c equal to 0 or 40. Second, we varied the 
degree of noise by setting n equal to 0 or 20. Finally, we varied the degree of trend by 
setting r equal to 0 or 10. For each condition, we generated two demand data sets for each 
of the six conditions that all started with the same 30 periods of historic demand. An 
overview of the experimental conditions and number of participants N in each condition is 
provided in Table 5.1. This resulted in a between-subject design with 6 x 2 = 12 data sets. 
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Table 5.1: Overview of experimental conditions 
Condition n c r N 
1 0 40 0 13 
2 0 40 10 13 
3 20 0 0 12 
4 20 0 10 20 
5 20 40 0 21 
6 20 40 10 21 
 
The experiment was conducted at a behavioral lab in a large public university in the 
US. The 102 participants were undergraduate students and completed the experiment as 
part of an operations course at the business school. Two participants had to be excluded 
from the analysis because of missing data. Of the 12 data sets, 4 data sets have 6 
participants, 2 data sets have 7 participants, 4 data sets have 10 participants, and the 
remaining 2 data set have 11 participants. 
 
5.4 Results 
Initial analyses. Table 5.2 provides an overview of the observed mean absolute 
error MAE for the 1-, 2-, and 3-step ahead forecasts MAE (ܦ௧ǡ ܨ௜௧ሻ= ቀ
ଵ
ௌூ்
ቁ σ ȁܨ௦௜௧ െௌூ்
ܦ௦௜௧ȁ, that is the average across all t periods, I subjects in both S demand data sets over all 
conditions. Simple t-tests show that the observed mean absolute error for the 1-step ahead 
forecast (MAE1) is significantly larger than the corresponding mean absolute error based 
on optimal forecasts for conditions 1 (p < .05), 4 (p < .01), and 6 (p < .01). For the 2- and 
3-step ahead forecasts, the observed mean absolute error (MAE2 and MAE3) is 
significantly larger than the optimal mean absolute error for all conditions (p < .01), with 
the exception of condition 3 where the difference in mean absolute error is not significant. 
A comparison across conditions is consistent with earlier research that has shown that 
performance deteriorates with increasing noise and change levels (Kremer et al., 2011; 
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Sanders, 1992). Furthermore, participants perform better in demand environments that do 
not contain trends. Finally, results show that (with the exception of MAE2=18.14 and 
MAE3=18.23 in condition 3), forecast performance deteriorates with increasing time 
horizon, both for the trended and untrended series which partly contradicts results from 
Bolger and Harvey (1993) who find increasing forecast errors only for trended series, but 
not untrended series as the forecast horizon is extended. 
 
Table 5.2: Observed forecasting performance by MAE 
MAE1 
r=0 n=0 n=20   r=10 n=0 n=20 
c=0 N/A 20.28 (18.02) c=0 N/A 31.84 (25.97) 
c=40 38.59 (30.44) 58.64 (39.07)   c=40 43.88 (36.32) 61.04 (41.17) 
MAE2 
r=0 n=0 n=20   r=10 n=0 n=20 
c=0 N/A 18.14 (18.30) c=0 N/A 48.04 (39.72) 
c=40 62.38 (48.43) 65.88 (50.16)   c=40 77.69 (62.76) 99.72 (64.84) 
MAE3 
r=0 n=0 n=20   r=10 n=0 n=20 
c=0 N/A 18.23 (18.26) c=0 N/A 70.30 (59.18) 
c=40 75.29 (55.62) 74.77 (59.01)   c=40 112.26 (90.54) 137.54 (90.51) 
 
Results of a multivariate analysis of variances showed that the different levels of 
noise, change and trend yielded different performance for the 1-step ahead forecast (FC1), 
F(5,99) = 5.39, p < .001, η = .22, the 2-step ahead forecast (FC2), F(5,99) = 43.20, p < 
.001, η = .70, and the 3-step ahead forecast (FC3), F(5,99) = 51.43, p < .001, η = .73. 
Conditions 3 and 4 consistently yielded the lowest mean absolute error for the three 
forecasts. These are the two conditions without change. On the contrary, condition 6 which 
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include high noise, change and trend consistently yielded the highest mean absolute error 
for the three forecasts. 
Pattern identification. For each observation, we classified the sequence of the 1-, 
2-, and 3-step ahead forecasts (FC1, FC2 and FC3) in terms of their direction relative to 
the previous step forecast. We identified four major patterns that these three forecasts 
display. We termed them trend, trend damping, trend reversal and constant. In the trend 
category, the three forecasts increased/decreased with either the same or an increasing 
positive or negative growth rate. In the trend damping category, the three forecasts exhibit 
an upward or downward trend which becomes smaller with increasing time horizon. In the 
trend reversal category, the forecast first increases/decreases and then turns in the opposite 
direction while overall a positive/negative trend over the whole 3 periods can still be 
observed. In the constant category, at least two of the forecasts are constant. The four 
major patterns with their subcategories are displayed in Figure 5.2 for upward and 
downward sloping time-series. 
Of the 2500 observations, 813 belonged to the trend category, 772 to the trend 
damping category, 749 to the trend reversal category, and 166 to the constant category. 
Consistent with earlier research (Harvey & Reimers, 2013), we find trend damping. 
However, we also obtain a large number of different patterns. More than half of the 
participants (53 percent) displayed one dominant pattern that they used in 13 or more of 
the 25 required forecast sequences. Apart from condition 6, we obtain one dominant 
pattern in each condition as shown in Table 5.3.  
  
63_Erim BW Protzner-Stand.job
 
 
 
111 
 
Figure 5.2: Forecast patterns 
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Table 5.3: Pattern distribution across conditions 
Condition Trend Trend damp Reversal Constant Total 
1 112 94 93 26 325 
2 105 148 42 30 325 
3 59 62 155 24 300 
4 229 160 92 19 500 
5 121 117 231 56 525 
6 187 191 136 11 525 
Total 813 772 749 166 2500 
 
We primarily find the trend pattern in conditions 1 and 4. The trend damping 
pattern can primarily be found in conditions 2 as well as 6. Finally, the trend reversal 
pattern is mostly shown in conditions 3 and 5. In condition 1, which contains high change, 
but no noise or trend, people seem to misperceive the change signals as trend patterns. In 
condition 4, which contains trend and noise, people still correctly identify trends. In 
condition 2, which contains high change and trend, but no noise, and condition 6, which 
contains noise, change and trend, people adequately perceive the trend, but damp it. As 
soon as there is noise and possibly change, but no trend, people do not explicitly display a 
trend pattern, but reverse their forecasts instead. This pattern overview is shown in Table 
5.4. 
Table 5.4: Dominant pattern per condition 
r=0 n=0 n=20 
c=0 N/A reversal 
c=40 trend reversal 
r=10 n=0 n=20 
c=0 N/A trend 
c=40 trend damp trend damp 
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5.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This research compares forecast behavior across different demand environments in 
order to identify under what conditions forecasters correctly perceive actual trends in time-
series, underestimate trends or incorporate illusionary trends into their forecasts. Our 
results show that the occurrence of illusionary trends is prevalent in environments 
characterized by low noise and high change. As noise increases, this faulty perception of 
non-existing trends decreases. This finding is in line with Kremer et al. (2011) who argue 
that noise obscures the false impression of trend-like changes in the level. Conversely, 
forecasters correctly identify actual trends in demand environments characterized by low 
change and high noise levels. This seems to suggest that, given a trended time-series, a 
forecaster can distinguish random variation from actual patterns in the data and detect 
trends, as long as additional persistent change in the level of the time-series is low. We 
also obtain trend damping effects for the trended time-series that either only contain noise 
or both change and noise. Combined with the insight that people correctly identify trends 
under low noise/high change levels, this seems to suggest that the phenomenon of trend 
damping cannot merely be attributed to increasing noise levels as has been suggested 
previously (Harvey & Reimers, 2013). Instead, the occurrence of trend-damping seems to 
depend on persistent changes in the level as well.  In addition to previously established 
forecast patterns, we identified another pattern that we termed trend reversal. This pattern 
is prevalent in untrended time-series with high noise levels, irrespective of changes in the 
level, but it also persists in time-series that contain trends. 
Our study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to demonstrate illusionary 
trend detection in judgmental time-series forecasting. The design of our experimental 
conditions allowed us to analyze the (false) perception of trends in detail under different 
demand conditions producing actual trends as well as trend-like sequences. Furthermore, 
our results suggest that people not only damp trends such that forecasts lie below upward 
trend lines and above downward trend lines (Lawrence & Makridakis, 1989), but also 
reverse trends that they observe. This behavior can possibly be attributed to the belief that 
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high values are followed by low values, also known as the gambler’s fallacy or “hot hand” 
phenomenon (Rabin & Vayanos, 2010). 
Our study also has several limitations. Previous research has shown that the 
direction of a time-series has an effect on trend damping behavior which was most 
pronounced in downward series (O'Connor et al., 1993). The time-series in the present 
study were all downward sloping series. Furthermore, we systematically varied the degree 
of noise, change and trend in the data such that it was either absent or present. As such the 
demand process was more complex than a simple stationary process and representative of 
real-life forecasting contexts. Nevertheless, a more refined setup with both upward and 
downward series including low, medium and high levels of noise and change and varying 
trend strengths (as has been used by Harvey & Reimers, 2013; and Thomson, Pollock, 
Gönül, & Önkal, 2013) should be used to further refine our understanding of the 
perception of trends in time-series data. Finally, the series containing actual trends could 
be varied in terms of the length of a streak to investigate whether the trend reversal pattern 
occurs more often for short streaks as suggested by research on regime shifting behavior 
(Asparouhova et al., 2009). 
Our findings have implications for forecasting practitioners in a variety of 
forecasting contexts. In practice, forecasters often use historic data, for example past sales 
or growth in market share, and extrapolate that information to determine possible trends in 
the future. Clearly, acting on perceived trends, that actually do not exist, can reduce 
forecast accuracy and have detrimental consequences for a number of planning decisions. 
Our findings suggest that decision-makers cannot always clearly distinguish actual from 
illusionary trends and persistent changes from random variations in time-series.  
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6 General Discussion 
Forecasting plays a pivotal role in organizations in order to match demand and 
supply.  Failing to achieve a match can affect the short- and long-term profitability of 
companies (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005; Hendricks & Singhal, 2009). Whereas early 
forecasting research thought of human judgment as detrimental to forecast accuracy, it is 
nowadays recognized as an indispensable decision aid complementing statistical methods 
of forecasting (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007; Sanders & Manrodt, 2003). However, human 
judgment in operational decision-making is subject to a number of biases (Gino & Pisano, 
2008) and forecasters employ various heuristics to make predictions when using their 
judgment (Harvey, 2007). Therefore, it is important to consider human judgment in 
forecasting to attenuate negative consequences of poor forecasts for many related 
operational decisions. Despite this, only a small amount of research on forecasting 
focusses on the influence of heuristics and biases on forecast accuracy (Lawrence, 
Goodwin, O'Connor, & Önkal, 2006). This dissertation aimed at shedding some light on 
this issue. In four empirical chapters, we attempted to provide insights that may clarify the 
human factor in forecasting. In doing so, we have merged different strands of literature by 
combining traditional forecasting literature with concepts from agency theory, social 
dilemma and negotiation, and psychology. First, we will discuss the contribution of each 
chapter to the forecasting literature. Second, we will discuss the implications of this 
dissertation for practice. We conclude this chapter and dissertation by providing directions 
for future research. 
Theoretical implications. Chapter 2 contributes to the forecasting literature in at 
least three ways. The main purpose of this study was to explore the role of forecast 
ownership in a cross-functional forecasting process and how a real organization attempted 
to address forecast biases rooted in functional differentiation and incentive misalignment. 
Hence, the focus of this chapter is on intentional biases that distort forecasts in line with 
departmental goals and agendas. Our findings revealed that forecast ownership can be a 
means to improve forecast accuracy while, at the same time, it can increase the conflict 
between the different departments involved in the planning process. A more holistic 
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approach to integrate the departmental forecasts, on the other hand, was found to be 
successful in managing the intentional biases even though the diverging incentives 
remained unchanged. This study extends the forecasting literature by conceptualizing the 
forecasting process as a social dilemma (Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange & 
Kuhlman, 1994), an idea that so far has only been used to help understand supply chain 
partnerships between firms (McCarter & Northcraft, 2007; McCarter & Kamal, 2013), but 
not supply chain collaborations within firms. Second, this study complements extant 
literature on forecast combination (Armstrong, 2001; Sanders & Ritzman, 2004) that often 
lacks the organizational context which we consider by exploring how differential roles of 
forecasters shape forecasting behavior. Finally, we developed a novel theoretical concept 
which we termed forecast ownership and propose that feelings of ownership can emerge 
with respect to a forecast as we observed a form of psychological ownership (Pierce, 
Kostova, & Dirks, 2001) among the departments that did not possess formal forecast 
ownership. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, we built on the findings of Chapter 2 and simplified the 
context of the collaborative forecasting process that we studied in a real organization to a 
dyadic situation that we put into two laboratory based experiments. The major contribution 
of the first experiment is that we studied the relationships between a forecaster’s 
departmental affiliation and social motives and forecasting behavior. As such our findings 
significantly extend our theoretical understanding of forecasting behavior in 
interdependent situations. We demonstrate that departmental affiliation influenced 
forecasting behavior such that people with an assigned operations role on average gave 
lower forecasts than those with a sales role, and that the extent of this forecast distortion 
depends on a person’s social value orientation (SVO). The results of this study relate to the 
growing literature on the role of managerial frames in forecasting (Kuo & Liang, 2004; 
Oliva & Watson, 2009; Önkal, Lawrence, & Zeynep Sayim, 2011). However, these 
managerial frames do not seem to have a universal effect on forecasting behavior. Instead, 
a person’s disposition towards cooperation or conflict helps explain forecasting behavior, 
taking the social context surrounding the forecasting process into account. 
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The experiment in Chapter 4 further investigated the effect of a forecaster’s 
departmental affiliation on forecasting behavior. In particular, we explored the related 
issue to what extent different incentives are related to accurate forecasts and credible 
forecast information sharing. Our findings highlight the joint effect of departmental 
affiliation and incentive. Specifically, we showed that sales managers were on average 
more concerned with lost sales whereas operations managers were more concerned with 
obsoletes, especially when following a departmental incentive. The major contribution of 
this study is that we show that departmental affiliation exerts its influence on forecasting 
behavior in interdepartmental forecast negotiations through being concerned with 
particular functional goals. As such our findings help understand the underlying 
psychological processes that cause forecast biases and thus devise de-biasing strategies 
(Katsikopoulos & Gigerenzer, 2013). By taking the motivational orientation of decision-
makers into account both experiments in Chapters 3 and 4 generally extend the scope of 
existing research in behavioral operations management that mainly revolves around 
identifying decision-making biases in operations (Bendoly, Croson, Goncalves, & Schultz, 
2010). 
In Chapter 5, we turn to the individual perspective in forecasting and explore how 
forecasters actually perceive trends in time-series data. Specifically, we identify different 
forecast patterns that forecasters exhibit under varying demand conditions. While we find 
previously established patterns, such as trend damping (Bolger & Harvey, 1993; Harvey & 
Reimers, 2013), we also find a pattern that we termed trend reversal that has not been 
researched yet. Moreover, we provide an empirical basis for the prevalence of illusionary 
trend detection, a tendency that has not been rigorously explored in previous literature 
(Kremer, Moritz, & Siemsen, 2011). Our study suggests that the way trends are perceived 
in time-series data is more complex than previously thought. 
Practical relevance. Forecasting is crucial for supply chain planning and the match 
of demand and supply. Most organizations use some form of judgment in their forecasting 
processes (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007) and forecast decisions are often made in groups 
(Lawrence et al., 2006). In the practitioner literature this process is commonly known as 
Sales and Operations Planning (S&OP) process (Singhal & Singhal, 2007). A central 
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challenge of collaborative forecasting within firms is to pool the decentralized knowledge 
about demand and supply that exists throughout the company and is often biased by human 
judgment (Kremer, Siemsen, & Thomas, 2012). This dissertation suggests that assigning 
forecast ownership to one organizational department that assumingly has the highest 
vested interest in producing accurate forecasts does not necessarily eliminate the 
systematic forecast biases to over- or under-forecast inherent in functional differentiation. 
Instead, both intentional and unconscious biases which are introduced into the forecasting 
process through human judgment can be minimized by properly understanding the 
underlying motivational and cognitive processes.  
Specifically, our studies demonstrate that, in organizational forecasting, the 
departmental role of a forecaster frames the way in which a forecaster interprets 
information and makes decisions. For that reason, forecasts can rarely be considered 
neutral. Different goals and incentive structures motivate people and may impede 
integrated solutions in inter-departmental forecast negotiations. It is therefore paramount 
for organizations to manage the motivations of employees so as to bridge the gap that 
organizational differentiation creates. One way to achieve that is by directly creating 
incentives conducive to collaboration or by indirectly fostering goals and motives which in 
turn affect forecasting and negotiation behavior. It is particularly promising that, if formal 
incentives are destructive for collaboration and cannot be changed, an individual’s 
disposition towards cooperation can still enhance collaboration among different 
departments. Thus, managerial interventions should aim at the selection of employees in 
such a way that their personalities and behaviors ‘fit’ strategically communicated 
negotiation outcomes, and to establish a match between individual as well as common 
(organizational) interests. 
In practice, forecasters often use historic data and extrapolate that information to 
determine possible trends in the future. In these situations, forecasters also use heuristics 
when making predictions. Clearly, acting on trend-like patterns, that in fact are random 
variations in the time-series, can reduce forecast accuracy and have detrimental 
consequences for a number of planning decisions. Our findings suggest that decision-
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makers cannot always clearly distinguish actual from illusionary trends and persistent 
changes from random variations in time-series.  
Future research. The four studies in this dissertation integrated a broad array of 
literature, employed different research methods and focused on different units of analyses: 
groups, dyads and the individual decision-maker. The results of all four studies relate to 
the growing literature on behavioral operations management, particularly focusing on 
forecasting. Despite their theoretical and practical contributions, the studies in this 
dissertation also suffer from limitations and raise several questions that merit attention and 
future research to expand our understanding of the human factor in forecasting, specifically 
the underlying motivational and cognitive processes that shape forecasting behavior. 
While the case study in Chapter 2 offered valuable insights to propose a novel 
theoretical concept, more case-based research should further develop and refine the 
concept of forecast ownership and elaborate on the dynamics between owners and non-
owners. An interesting avenue for future research would also be to compare cases in which 
the forecast owner is located in different organizational departments, such as Finance 
instead of Supply Chain or a neutral entity as suggested by Oliva and Watson (2011). 
Forecast tournaments with students or managers may offer a good alternative to test 
theoretical propositions (Tetlock, Mellers, Rohrbaugh, & Chen, 2014), if access to real 
organizations is difficult to obtain. 
With the two experiments in Chapters 3 and 4, we were able to establish the 
importance of social value orientation and goal concern in inter-departmental forecast 
negotiations. Nevertheless, our conclusions apply to dyadic situations, whereas in reality 
the forecasting process may include various departments. Moreover, our negotiations 
context in both experiments was rather simplified in that participants negotiated with a 
computer agent and not another real human being. In a more complex interdependent 
negotiation, whether computer-based or face-to-face, the negotiations could revolve around 
departmental issues and priorities (as opposed to the forecast number only) that are 
relevant for ultimately understanding the motivations that affect forecasting behavior, and 
that are more representative of real forecasting processes in organizations. While we 
examined social value orientation and incentives separately in the two experiments, the 
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investigation of their joint effect could be a fruitful avenue for future research. It is 
reasonable to assume that prosocial individuals have a high concern for their own as well 
as the other department’s goals, even if they have a departmental incentive, whereas people 
with an individualist value orientation will only have a high concern for their own, but not 
the other department’s goal under such circumstances. Previous research suggests that 
interdepartmental negotiations and problem-solving behavior in conflict situations are 
indeed influenced by individual, relational and organizational factors (Nauta & Sanders, 
2000). 
Finally, earlier research on human perception of trends in time-series data assumed 
that people detect but damp trends that actually exist in the data (Harvey & Reimers, 
2013). Our study provides evidence for additional forecast patterns that people exhibit 
when making predictions from trended time-series. Moreover, we provide empirical 
evidence for the phenomenon of illusionary trend detection in judgmental time-series 
forecasting. While we used a rigorous experimental design, there is an opportunity to 
extend the experiment by comparing downward-with upward-sloping time-series and 
refine the variation of the different time-series parameters: noise, change and trend, as well 
as the length of actual patterns in the data. 
Concluding remark. In this dissertation, I set out to shed light on the human factor 
in forecasting. I found that organizational roles, that is being a member of a particular 
department, provide a strong frame for the way in which people interpret information and 
make decisions in collaborative forecasting processes. A key take-away from this research 
is that forecasts in organizations are rarely neutral and often serve a certain purpose other 
than predicting future sales.  This is unfortunate, if one considers the importance of 
matching demand and supply for organizational survival. As reducing functional 
differentiation or changing dysfunctional incentives are often not a viable option, our 
findings that highlight the importance of motivational orientations in such interdependent 
forecasting processes are promising. Furthermore, I discovered that already on the 
individual level, human judgment in making predictions can be erroneous. I am convinced 
that understanding the underlying cognitive and motivational processes is paramount to 
devising strategies for more accurate forecasts. I hope others will build on the findings of 
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this dissertation and explore related intriguing research questions that certainly still exist to 
further expand and establish behavioral operations management as a research discipline. 
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Summary in English 
Prior academic research has recognized human judgment as an indispensable 
decision-aid in demand forecasting although it is subject to a number of biases. Therefore, 
it is important to understand human judgment in forecasting to explain poor forecast 
decisions and attenuate their negative consequences for many related operational decisions. 
This dissertation is part of a growing research field in which human behavior and cognition 
are incorporated into analytical models of operations management. It bundles four 
empirical studies on demand forecasting, using a variety of research methods and units of 
analysis. These studies provide new insights into the role of human judgment in demand 
forecasting. 
The functional specialization and differentiation inherent to most organizations 
usually shapes forecasting behavior in such a way that it benefits departmental goals and 
agendas. Lack of clear forecast ownership, diffused responsibilities and varying interests 
and incentives are often at odds with the organizational goal of producing accurate 
forecasts. We identify and describe the potential benefits of forecast ownership and 
mechanically combined departmental forecasts on the tendency to over- and under-forecast 
demand. Giving people the opportunity to have a say in the forecast, to invest time and 
energy in the forecasting process, and disseminating information and knowledge about the 
forecast and the forecasting process are all means to improve the involvement and 
commitment from non-owning stakeholders in the forecasting process. 
The findings in this dissertation also show that departmental roles, for example 
being a member of a Sales or Operations Department, offer a particular frame with which 
forecasters interpret information and make decisions. However, the effect of departmental 
affiliation on forecast accuracy depends on a forecaster’s individual disposition towards 
cooperation and conflict. Prosocial individuals are less likely than proself individuals to 
deliberately bias forecasts in forecast negotiations. Our studies suggest that framing 
interdepartmental forecast negotiations as cooperative, encouraging discussions between 
departments to understand the impact of individual decisions on others as well as allowing 
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time for negotiation to converge opinions could all bridge the gap that organizational 
differentiation creates. 
Human judgment in demand forecasting can also be erroneous, especially when 
forecasters use historic data and extrapolate that information to determine possible trends 
in the future. Such situations are not characterized by organizational differentiation that 
may bias forecasts. Instead, forecasters use heuristics to make decisions. This dissertation 
shows that forecaster act on trend-like patterns that, in fact, are random variations in the 
time-series. It seems that people cannot clearly distinguish actual from illusionary trends 
and persistent changes from random variations in time-series. Our results indicate that 
forecasters should be aware of their tendency to read system into noise and to 
underestimate trends. Finally, decision support systems should provide appropriate 
presentation modes and allow for the decomposition of the different components of a time-
series to help forecasters make accurate predictions. 
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
Wetenschappelijk onderzoek heeft het menselijk oordeel erkend als een onmisbare 
beslissingshulp bij vraagvoorspellingen, ondanks het feit dat menselijk gedrag en 
beslissingen lijden onder een aantal heuristieken. Het is daarom belangrijk om negatieve 
gevolgen van het menselijk oordeel te begrijpen en slechte voorspellingen en gerelateerde 
operationele beslissingen te vermijden. Dit proefschrift maakt onderdeel uit van een 
groeiend onderzoeksdomein waarin menselijk gedrag en cognitie in analytische modellen 
van Operations Management in acht worden genomen. Het voegt vier empirische studies 
samen waarin de rol van menselijk gedrag op vraagvoorspellingen wordt getoetst, met 
behulp van verschillende onderzoeksmethoden. 
De functionele specialisatie in organisaties beïnvloedt vraagvoorspellingen op een 
manier dat departementale doelen en agenda’s er baat bij hebben. Zowel gebrek aan 
duidelijke verantwoordelijkheden als verschillende interesses en motieven staan vaak in de 
weg van nauwkeurige vraagvoorspellingen. We identificeren en beschrijven de mogelijke 
voordelen van het geven van duidelijke verantwoordelijkheden en het gebruiken van 
mechanisch gecombineerde vraagvoorspellingen op de neiging voorspellingen te hoog of 
te laag te stellen. Wanneer mensen de mogelijkheid krijgen om invloed uit te oefenen op 
de vraagvoorspelling, informatie en kennis over het voorspellingsproces te verwerven, en 
informatie ontvangen over het voorspellingsproces, kan dit de betrokkenheid van 
stakeholders verbeteren. 
De resultaten van dit proefschrift maken tevens duidelijk dat de departementale 
rollen een bepaald perspectief bieden waarmee mensen informatie interpreteren en 
beslissingen nemen. Echter, het effect van de departementale aansluiting op nauwkeurige 
voorspellingen is afhankelijk van de individuele neiging ten aanzien van samenwerking en 
conflict. Onze studies laten zien dat coöperatieve onderhandelingen en discussies tussen 
afdelingen het begrip voor de invloed van individuele beslissingen op anderen kunnen 
verbeteren. 
Menselijk oordeel bij vraagvoorspelling kan ook verkeerd uitwerken, bijvoorbeeld 
wanneer mensen gebruik maken van historische gegevens en die informatie extrapoleren 
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om mogelijke ontwikkelingen in de toekomst te bepalen. In dergelijke situaties maken 
mensen gebruik van heuristieken om beslissingen te nemen. Dit proefschrift toont aan dat 
mensen willekeurige variaties in tijdreeksen als trend-achtige patronen interpreteren. Het 
lijkt erop dat mensen geen duidelijk onderscheid kunnen maken tussen werkelijke en 
illusionaire trends. Tot slot zouden besluitvormingssystemen moeten voorzien in goede 
presentatie modellen, en het mogelijk moeten maken om de verschillende onderdelen van 
tijdsreeksen te onderscheiden, om zodoende mensen die voorspellingen maken te helpen 
dit zo accuraat mogelijk te doen. 
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A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE ON DEMAND FORECASTING
Prior academic research has recognized human judgment as an indispensable decision-
aid in demand forecasting although it is subject to a number of biases. Therefore, it is
important to understand human judgment in forecasting to explain poor forecast
decisions and attenuate their negative consequences for many related operational
decisions. This dissertation bundles four empirical studies on demand forecasting and is
part of a growing research field in which human behavior and cognition are incorporated
into analytical models of operations management.
The functional specialization and differentiation inherent to most organizations usually
shapes forecasting behavior in such a way that it benefits departmental goals and
agendas. Lack of clear forecast ownership, diffused responsibilities and varying interests
and incentives are often at odds with the organizational goal of producing accurate
forecasts. We identify and describe the potential benefits of forecast ownership and
mechanically combined departmental forecasts on the tendency to over- and under-
forecast demand. The findings in this dissertation also show that departmental roles offer
a particular frame with which forecasters interpret information and make decisions.
However, the effect of departmental affiliation on forecast accuracy depends on a
forecaster’s individual disposition towards cooperation and conflict. Our studies suggest
that it is paramount for organizations to manage the motivations of employees so as to
bridge the gap that organizational differentiation creates. One way to achieve that is by
directly creating incentives conducive to collaboration or by indirectly fostering goals and
motives which in turn affect forecasting and negotiation behavior.
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